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ABSTRACT
Ignorantia legis non excusat—ignorance of the law does not excuse—is a centuries-old criminal law maxim familiar to lawyer and
layperson alike. Under the doctrine, an accused finds little protection
in the claim “But, I did not know the law,” for all are presumed either
to be familiar with the law’s commands or to proceed in ignorance at
their own peril. The ignorant must be punished along with the knowing, the maxim teaches, to achieve a better educated and more lawabiding populace and to avoid the easy-to-assert and difficult-todispute claim of ignorance that would otherwise flow from the lips of
any person facing criminal punishment.
Despite this country’s long-standing allegiance to the hoary maxim,
over the last century, and in particular over the last decade, the courts
have seriously eroded the ignorantia legis principle by frequently con-
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struing the mens rea term “willfully” to require proof of an accused’s
knowledge of the law. The erosive effect that these constructions have
had on the ignorantia legis maxim is referred to in this Article as the
“jurisprudence of willfulness.” Professor Davies demonstrates that,
contrary to the maxim, the number of federal criminal statutes that
have been construed to impose such a heightened mens rea requirement is already quite large. The Article reveals that, if the courts continue to employ their current interpretive approach to the term
“willfully,” at least 160 additional federal statutes containing the term
are at risk of similar treatment.
The author argues that contemporary constructions of the troublesome scienter term to impose a knowledge of the law element have
been grounded on doubtful, unchallenged logic and have bequeathed
a legacy of grave interpretive confusion. Professor Davies maintains
that much of the “jurisprudence of willfulness” is inimical to congressional judgments and, therefore, violative of rule of law and separation of powers principles. The Article urges a return to the ignorantia
legis principle in all cases in which a clear legislative intent to abandon the maxim when employing the term “willfully” is missing.
Ignorance of the law excuses no man;
not that all men know the law,
but because ‘tis an excuse every man will plead,
1
and no man can tell how to refute him.

INTRODUCTION
The principle of ignorantia legis non excusat2—ignorance of the
law does not excuse—is perhaps the most well-rooted maxim in the
Anglo-American criminal law. It has been recognized by courts3 and
legal thinkers4 for centuries, it has been enacted into law,5 and it is
1. JOHN SELDEN, Law, in TABLE-TALK (1689), quoted in THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 133
(David S. Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986) [hereinafter QUOTABLE LAWYER].
2. The principle’s terminology has varied slightly over the centuries, but its core idea has
not. See Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 76
n.1 (1908) (noting that the maxim has been variously stated as “ignorantia legis neminem excusat,” “ignorantia eorum, quae quis scire tenetur, non excusat,” “ ignorantia juris, quod quisque
tenetur scire, neminem excusat,” and “ignorantia juris haud excusat”).
3. For the principle’s Roman origins and English case authorities, see id. at 77-80; infra
notes 37-55 and accompanying text. For early American case authority, see infra notes 56, 68.
4. Numerous excellent books and articles discussing the maxim are available. See, e.g.,
JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 360-414 (2d ed. 1960); OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 47-48 (1881); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF
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familiar to jurist and layperson alike.6 Under the maxim, individuals
can be criminally punished when they engage in prohibited conduct
even when they are not familiar with, or do not fully understand, the
law’s commands. Citizens are compelled either to know the law or to
proceed in ignorance at their own peril. While sometimes harsh, the
gains secured by the maxim—a better educated and more law-abiding
citizenry, and the avoidance of pervasive mistake of law claims—are
thought to outweigh any individual injustice resulting from its application.
Despite its familiarity and wide usage, the ignorantia legis principle has been seriously eroded over the last century,7 and in recent
years, this erosion has threatened to become a landslide.8 At one time
the list of exceptions to the maxim was quite short, but the courts of
the twentieth century have quietly expanded it. The number of federal criminal statutes under which courts have abandoned the maxim
is now particularly large, and challenges based on ignorance or mis-

CRIMINAL LAW 405-15 (1978); Jerome Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33
INDIANA L.J. 1 (1957); Livingston Hall & Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8
U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1941); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958); Keedy, supra note 2; Rollin M. Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake
in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35 (1939).
5. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-204 (West 1989) (declaring that “ignorance of
the law does not relieve a person of criminal responsibility”); GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-6 (1990)
(stating that “[i]gnorance of the law excuses no one”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152 (West
1983) (declaring that “ignorance of the law does not excuse from punishment for its violation”);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-3-1 (Michie 1998) (stating that “ignorance of the law does not excuse a person from punishment for its violation”).
6. As one legal scholar put it, “Almost the only knowledge of law possessed by many
people is that ignorance of it is no excuse . . . .” WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 405.
7. This Article limits its discussion of the departure from the maxim primarily to the federal context, but this erosion is observable in state criminal justice systems as well. A recent,
highly publicized ignorance of the law question involves Linda Tripp. Tripp is alleged to have
surreptitiously taped private conversations with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky.
A Maryland statute prohibits the “willful” electronic interception of such private communications without the consent of all parties. See MD. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402 (1998).
However, the statute has been construed to require proof of actual or constructive knowledge
of the prohibition to support a conviction. See Petric v. State, 504 A.2d 1168 (Md. App. 1986)
(approving a jury instruction requiring proof that the defendant knew or should have known he
was violating state law by secretly recording his conversations). To convict Tripp of violating
the state statute, therefore, the prosecutor would have to show that Tripp knew or should have
known about the state law that she was violating when she recorded her conversations with
Lewinsky—a difficult burden to meet.
8. See infra notes 10-26 and accompanying text (listing cases that have construed a variety of federal statutes to require knowledge that the proscribed conduct was unlawful).
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take of law9 grounds in the federal courts are both common and frequently successful. “Knowledge of illegality” has now been construed
to be an element in a wide variety of statutory and regulatory criminal provisions, including the federal tax provisions,10 the federal false
statement provisions,11 the federal anti-structuring provisions,12 the
9. Although often used interchangeably, “ignorance” of the law and “mistake” of law
denote two different concepts. A person who acts in ignorance of the law acts in a state of unawareness as to the law’s existence. A person who acts under a mistake of law is aware of the
existence of a law controlling her behavior but misunderstands what the law prohibits or commands. Despite the conceptual differences between the terms, courts and commentators frequently use the terms interchangeably and consider both states of mind subject to the ignorantia legis maxim. See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 4, at 36-37 (applying the maxim to examples of
ignorance and mistake); but see Keedy, supra note 2, at 90-92 (describing the difference and
arguing that mistakes, but not ignorance, should be excused). Although important, the debate
about whether the maxim should be applied only in cases involving ignorance of, but not a mistake about, the law is beyond the scope of this Article. In this Article I adopt the practice of
those who use the terms interchangeably.
10. The term “willfully” has been defined to require a showing that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a “known legal duty” under a number of tax provisions. See
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (holding that the “willfully” in I.R.C. § 7201
(1994), proscribing federal tax evasion, requires showing that defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a “known legal duty”); United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) (per
curiam) (requiring the same showing to establish willful conduct under I.R.C. § 7206(1) (1994),
prohibiting willful filing of false federal income tax returns); United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S.
346, 361 (1973) (same); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933) (requiring a showing of “evil intent” to establish willful failure to pay federal tax under I.R.C. § 1265(a) (West
1928) (current version at I.R.C. § 7203 (1994)); United States v. Gurary, 860 F.2d 521, 523 (2d
Cir. 1988) (requiring a showing of intentional violation of “known legal duty” to support conviction under I.R.C. § 7206(2) (1994) for willfully aiding and assisting the filing of false federal
corporate income tax returns), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989); United States v. Wellendorf,
574 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring knowledge of law to prove defendant willfully filed
false income tax withholding forms, in violation of I.R.C. § 7205 (1994)).
11. See United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring knowledge that conduct was unlawful to support a conviction for causing campaign treasurers to submit false reports to the Federal Election Commission, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)); United
States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court properly precluded
a good-faith defense in instructing the jury on the willfulness element of a conviction for making false statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §
78m(a) (1994)).
12. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) (holding that violation of 31 U.S.C.
§ 5322 (1994), which prohibits structuring of transactions to avoid bank reporting requirements,
requires knowledge that the act was unlawful); United States v. Simon, 85 F.3d 906, 908-09 (2d
Cir. 1996) (same); Peck v. United States, 73 F.3d 1220 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing a conviction
under § 5322 because the judge erroneously instructed the jury regarding the “willfully” requirement); United States v. Rogers, 18 F.3d 265, 267 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring knowledge of
conduct’s illegality for conviction under I.R.C. § 6050I (1994) for evading business receipts reporting requirements); United States v. Reguer, 901 F. Supp. 515, 518 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(applying Ratzlaf retroactively to reverse § 5322 conviction). After Ratzlaf was decided, Congress amended the structuring provision to eliminate the “knowledge of illegality” requirement. See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
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federal firearms provisions,13 the Medicare and Medicaid antikickback provisions,14 the Occupational Safety and Health Act,15 the
Child Support Recovery Act,16 and the Trading With the Enemy
Act.17 Proof of knowledge of illegality has also been required to support a conviction for willfully misapplying student loan funds,18 willfully exporting an aircraft,19 willfully attempting to export weapons or
ammunition,20 willfully transporting monetary instruments in excess
No. 103-325, § 411(b), 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (1994) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(4)(A)
(1994)).
13. See Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1946-47 (1998) (holding that to convict defendant charged with willfully violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 924(a)(1)(D) (1994), which
prohibit dealing firearms without a federal license, proof must be offered that the defendant
knew that his conduct was unlawful, although proof that he was aware of the federal licensing
requirement is not necessary).
14. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995) (reading “willfully” in
the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994), to impose
a knowledge of the law requirement).
15. See United States v. Ladish Malting Co., 135 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding
determination by magistrate judge that criminal violation of workplace safety regulations under
Occupational Safety and Health Act § 17(e), 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1994), requires proof the defendant had “basic legal information”); McLaughlin v. Union Oil Co., 869 F.2d 1039, 1047 (7th
Cir. 1989) (holding that a violation of OSHA “is not willful when it is based on a nonfrivolous
interpretation of OSHA’s regulations”).
16. See United States v. Williams, 121 F.3d 615, 621 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that proving
a willful failure to pay child support under the Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228
(1994), requires the government to show that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, the defendant knew about that legal duty, and the defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated
that known legal duty).
17. See United States v. Macko, 994 F.2d 1526, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that
“willfully” in the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 16 (1994), requires proof that
the defendants knew of and intentionally violated an embargo); United States v. Frade, 709
F.2d 1387, 1391 (11th Cir. 1993) (requiring a showing of specific intent to prove violation of the
Act).
18. See United States v. Bates, 96 F.3d 964, 970 (7th Cir. 1996) (construing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1097(a) (1994), which makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully misapply federally insured
student loan funds, to require proof that an accused exercised unauthorized control over such
funds with knowledge that such an exercise was a violation of the law), aff’d, 118 S. Ct. 285, 291
& n.7 (1997) (noting, however, that the question of whether a defendant had to have knowledge of illegality was not before the Court).
19. See Etheridge v. United States, 380 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1967) (approving a conviction under 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1964) (repealed 1976) (superseded by 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994 &
Supp. II 1996)), where the government offered proof that “each of the defendants knew it was
unlawful to export from the United States to Haiti the aircraft”).
20. See United States v. Hernandez, 662 F.2d 289, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1981) (construing “with
intent” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) (1976) and “willful” as used in 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1976
& Supp. 1978) to require specific intent); United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir.
1978) (construing “willfully” as used in 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1970) (repealed 1976) (superseded by
22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)) to require specific intent); United States v. LizarragaLizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1976) (construing “willfully” as used in 22 U.S.C. § 1934
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of $5,000 into the United States,21 willfully neglecting to submit for
induction into the Army,22 intentionally using the contents of telephone conversations recorded in violation of Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,23 and knowingly acquiring or possessing food coupons in a manner not authorized by law.24
Conspiring25 or causing another26 to commit one of these substantive
offenses has also been found to require proof that the accused knew
that he was violating the law. These constructions establish that, contrary to the ignorantia legis principle, ignorance or mistake of law has
already become an acceptable excuse in a number of regulatory and
nonregulatory settings, particularly in prosecutions brought under
statutes requiring proof of “willful” conduct on the part of the ac-

(1970) (repealed 1976) (superseded by 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)), and 22 C.F.R.
pt. 121 (1970) to require proof that defendant knew his conduct was violative of the law).
21. See United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 889-91 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that willful
transportation of cash in excess of $5,000 into the country in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 1058,
1101(a)(1)(A) (1970) required proof of knowledge of the law forbidding that conduct); United
States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. Granda,
565 F.2d 922, 923-26 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. San Juan, 545 F.2d 314, 319-20 (2d
Cir. 1976) (same).
22. See United States v. Krosky, 418 F.2d 65, 67 (6th Cir. 1969) (finding insufficient a jury
charge that failed to advise that “willfully” required proof that the accused failure was done
“with the specific intent to do that which the law forbids . . . with bad purpose either to disobey
or to disregard the law”).
23. See United States v. Wuliger, 981 F.2d 1497, 1502-03 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that
knowledge of the illegality of the wire interception is an element of the offense described in 18
U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d) (1988)).
24. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985) (holding that a person accused
of knowing possession of food stamps in manner unauthorized by 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1982)
must be shown to have known the possession was unlawful); United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d
1221, 1227-28 (8th Cir. 1982) (same).
25. See Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 681-82 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating that conspiracy to evade taxes under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1952) required showing of specific intent); United States v. Alston, 77 F.3d 713, 718 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding that conspiracy to structure transactions under 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (1988) required
showing of specific intent); United States v. Kim, 65 F.3d 123, 126 (9th Cir. 1995) (same);
United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 192-93 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that conspiracy to export
weapons without requisite license or approval under 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (1970) (repealed 1970)
(superseded by 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)) required showing of specific intent);
United States v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519, 523-24 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that conspiracy to intercept wire or oral communications under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 2511 (1970) required showing of
specific intent).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Reguer, 901 F. Supp 515, 518-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (requiring
the prosecution to prove the defendant had “knowledge of the illegality of the act” when causing a bank to fail to file a currency transaction report under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994)).
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cused.27 Under the reasoning employed in these cases, at least 160 additional federal statutes, collected in Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix,
are at risk of similar treatment.
Although the shift away from the ignorantia legis maxim in cases
of willfulness is unprecedented in scope, the academy has yet to either confront the breadth of the trend or critically examine the rationales underlying it. This Article assumes that task, first, by taking
stock of the erosive forces that have transformed the ignorantia legis
maxim over the last century; second, by critically examining the justi-

27. Requests for mistake of law jury instructions have been made in numerous prosecutions brought under statutes containing a related, but importantly different mens rea requirement, the requirement of a “knowing violation” of some federal provision. On the whole,
courts have resisted reading the phrase to require proof of knowledge of illegality. Most read
the phrase to require proof that the accused had actual knowledge of the facts prohibited by the
statute, but not that the accused had actual knowledge that her conduct violated the statute,
particularly where the statute or regulation concerned an industry responsible for the handling
of “dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials.” United States
v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) (holding that 18 U.S.C. §
834(a) (1964), which authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to promulgate
regulations governing the transportation of certain corrosive liquids and imposed criminal penalties on those who “knowingly violated” those regulations, required proof that defendant
knew the nature of his acts, not proof that he knew his acts violated the regulations). In such a
heavily regulatory context, “the probability of regulation is so great” that the phrase
“knowingly violates” carries a presumption that the accused is aware of the regulation, and that
Congress intended the phrase to be a “shorthand” method of referencing the acts or omissions
prohibited elsewhere. Id. at 560-65. Thus, the government did not have to show that an accused
prosecuted for “knowingly violat[ing]” ICC regulations governing the interstate transportation
of corrosives knew that his method of transportation violated the regulations. See id. Similarly,
a defendant charged with “knowingly violat[ing]” the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which imposes criminal penalties on any person who “knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified
in [RCRA] . . . without a permit,” 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2), must be shown to have known the
nature of the hazardous matter treated, stored or disposed. He need not have known that the
waste matter had been identified or listed among the RCRA provisions or that he lacked a
requisite permit. See United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 538 (2d Cir. 1995) (collecting
cases). For the same reason, one accused of “knowingly violat[ing]” the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), which requires any person in charge of a facility who has knowledge of
an excess discharge of a hazardous substance to notify the Environmental Protection Agency
“as soon as he has knowledge” of the prohibited release, see 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a), need only be
shown to have been aware of his acts, not the regulatory requirements. See United States v.
Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 964-67 (2d Cir. 1993). In each of these cases, courts have adhered to the
ignorantia legis maxim, and declined to attribute to Congress the view that the phrase
“knowingly violates” requires “proof of knowledge of the law, as well as the facts.” International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), is an important,
but largely lonely departure from this interpretive trend. In Liparota, the Supreme Court construed the phrase “knowingly violates” to require proof of an accused’s knowledge of the law.
See id. at 426.
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fications that have been offered for the movement away from the
maxim; and third, by reconceptualizing the maxim’s proper scope.
Part I of this Article reviews the maxim’s venerable ancestry, the
principal exceptions to the maxim and the doctrine’s primary rationales. Although the maxim is many centuries old, interests of individuated justice have always curbed an overly rigid application of the
principle. The most rapid development of exceptions to the maxim,
however, has occurred during the last century, especially the last decade. This development has been unaccompanied by significant academic scrutiny and has not been supported by a consistent and coherent justification.
Part II assesses and critiques the maxim’s current condition. This
assessment shows that mistake of law claims in prosecutions requiring proof of “willful” conduct are copious, and although the maxim
retains some force,28 courts side with parties advancing such claims
with surprising frequency.29 Because collectively the cases emphasize
the pivotal role played by the mens rea term “willfully” in decisions
deviating from the maxim, this Part refers to the trend as the
“jurisprudence of willfulness.” This body of case law, generated by
the United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts over the
last century, dramatically accelerated the pace of the trend away
from the ignorantia legis maxim, and two of the most recent of these
decisions—Ratzlaf v. United States30 and Bryan v. United States31—
employed interpretive techniques certain to encourage additional future departures from the principle. Especially disturbing in this jurisprudence is the willingness of courts to construe “willfully” to warrant a departure from the maxim without first consulting legislative
history to determine the congressional intent underlying the use of
the term.32 This Part concludes that, to date, the judicial shift away
from the maxim has been grounded on doubtful, unchallenged logic
and has bequeathed a legacy of grave interpretive confusion.
Part III of the Article argues for a reinvigoration of the maxim,
rejecting much of the “jurisprudence of willfulness” as inimical to
congressional judgments, and therefore inconsistent with the rule of
28. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939 (1998)).
29. See supra notes 10-26 and accompanying text.
30. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
31. 118 S. Ct. 1939 (1998).
32. The proffered justification for donning such interpretive “blinders” is that the meaning
of the term is so unambiguous as to make resort to such legislative history wholly unnecessary.
See, e.g., Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147-48.
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law and with separation of powers principles. Despite the rising number of decisions construing “willfully” to exhibit a congressional intent to make knowledge of the law an element, evidence of Congress’s disenchantment with the maxim is scarce. Indeed, there is
plain evidence to the contrary. Various legislative indicators suggest
that Congress continues to enact criminal statutes with the expectation that the maxim remains a fundamental presumption (albeit a rebuttable one) in the interpretation of criminal statutes.33 These indicators flatly contradict the conclusion reached by a number of courts
that Congress intends to make knowledge of the law an element each
time it employs the term “willfully” in a federal criminal statute.
The ignorantia legis maxim is grounded on sound, if competing,
rationales and centuries of experience. At minimum, any trend that
disregards this canon of interpretation should first withstand rigorous
scrutiny. The “jurisprudence of willfulness” fails to do so. Part III
contains a tripartite proposal that should be used to determine
whether a criminal statute containing language of willfulness should
be construed to permit an ignorance or mistake of law claim. The
first prong of the proposal requires recognition that genuine searches
for evidence of the intended meaning of “willfully” will often require
the courts to go beyond statutory text. Although anathema to textualists,34 this is necessary, as “willfully” is rarely textually defined in
federal criminal statutes.35 Second, the maxim itself makes it appropriate to presume that Congress did not intend ignorance or mistakes
of law to be a defense. Thus, unless plain evidence of a contrary design can be located either in the text of a criminal statute or in its
legislative history, the nation’s longstanding devotion to the maxim
requires the preclusion of such a defense. Finally, a categorical exception from the presumption is appropriate for tax prosecutions in light
of Congress’s demonstrated acquiescence to mistake of law claims in
that context. In short, this Part proposes a return to the presumption
that “[i]gnorance of the law excuses no man”36 in the absence of a
clear signal indicating a legislative desire to deviate from the maxim.

33. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the legislative overruling of the Ratzlaf decision, in
which the Court interpreted “willfully” to require proof of knowledge of the federal antistructuring law).
34. See infra note 255.
35. See infra Part III.B.
36. QUOTABLE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 133.
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IGNORANCE OF THE LAW DOES NOT EXCUSE, EXCEPT WHEN IT
DOES

A. The Roman Experience
The ignorantia legis maxim is of ancient vintage, dating back at
least as far as the days of the Roman Empire.37 Legal scholars have
described the Roman maxim primarily as a concept of civil law,
which was founded on the straightforward (if fictitious) rationale that
the law was “certain and capable of being ascertained.”38 Thus, in litigation, positive proof of a citizen’s knowledge of the law’s requirements or proscriptions was not required. Rather, citizens were presumed to be familiar with the law, for it was not the function of the
Roman law “to aid the fools.”39
Even from these early beginnings, however, application of the
maxim was subject to important, if limited, exceptions when the law
was not, in fact, definite and knowable.40 Despite widespread acceptance of the maxim, Roman law permitted certain groups of persons
to claim ignorance of the law as a defense. The very young, for example, were considered to be incapable of comprehending important
aspects of the law and thus were permitted to excuse their deviant
behavior by claiming ignorance of the law’s requirements or re-

37. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *25
(Charles M. Haar ed., Beacon Press 1962). Other writers claim that the doctrine descends from
Norman or possibly pre-Norman absolute liability rules. See Hall & Seligman, supra note 4, at
643-46.
38. Keedy, supra note 2, at 78. Although this rationale is roundly recognized today to be a
legal fiction, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 13.01[B], at 141-42
(1987), the laws of the Roman Empire were reasonably well integrated with the community
mores of the time. See Hall & Seligman, supra note 4, at 644 (“[T]he early criminal law appears
to have been well integrated with the mores of the time, out of which it arose as ‘custom.’”).
For this reason, the claim that the law was “definite and knowable” would have been more
easily defended then than it would be today. See DRESSLER, supra, at 141 (“At common law
this claim was at least partially plausible. Few crimes existed and all of them involved conduct
malum in se.”). Nevertheless, even under the common law it is likely that the original rationale
for the maxim was largely fictitious. As put by Professor Dressler, under the common law,
“laws were not enacted by legislatures and published. Rather, courts created and shaped law on
a case-by-case basis,” id. at 142, which meant that the criminal law changed incrementally
every time a new decision was handed down. This makes any claim that the law (even early
Roman law) was “definite and knowable” doubtful, at best. See id.
39. Vera Bolgar, The Present Function of the Maxim Ignorantia Juris Neminem Excusat—
A Comparative Study, 52 IOWA L. REV. 626, 631 (1967).
40. See id. at 627-32; Hall, supra note 4, at 16.
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straints.41 So too might disenfranchised women, soldiers away from
home, and “peasants and other persons of small intelligence”42 escape
penalty by claiming unfamiliarity with certain of the law’s commands.
The common link between these disparate groups appears to be that
they were all thought to lack some essential quality that would enable
them to appraise or know the law, such as aptitude (women and
members of the underclass), maturity (children) or notice of the law’s
enactment (absent soldiers). Latitude for error was accorded these
people so as not to penalize them for failing to meet legal obligations
that were, to them, either unknown or unknowable.
The Roman reprieve extended only so far, however. Although
these disparate groups of Roman citizens were considered to be incapable of knowing the jus civile (the body of civil law that governed
Roman relations), they were expected to know and comply with the
jus gentium (the system of laws that “natural reason” had settled
among all persons everywhere).43 As generously put much later by legal commentator John Austin, because these persons did not fall
within the state of “general imbecility,”44 they could be expected to
know the jus gentium, which was based on principles of natural reason presumptively understood by all.45
B. The Maxim in England
In England, the maxim took on a less forgiving cast. Although it
appears that the maxim originated in civil actions under Roman law,46
the English courts permitted it to control the outcome of criminal actions as well.47 In addition, the English common law courts defined
41. See Keedy, supra note 2, at 80.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 80; Bolgar, supra note 39, at 630 & n.10.
44. 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 500 (Robert Campbell ed., 4th ed.
1873) (1861).
45. See id. at 501. The Roman distinction between the jus gentium and the jus civile parallels contemporary arguments made in the criminal context that mistakes of law should excuse
mala prohibita but not mala in se offenses. See infra Part II.C.3.
46. See Keedy, supra note 2, at 77-78.
47. Cases beginning as early as the eleventh century firmly established the maxim in both
civil and criminal proceedings:
For a mistake in point of law, which every person of discretion not only may, but is
bound and presumed to know, is in criminal cases no sort of defence. Ignorantia juris,
quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat, is as well the maxim of our own law, as
it was of the Roman.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *27; see also Keedy, supra note 2, at 78-80 (citing cases dating
back to the early thirteenth century). The earliest English case of record, decided in 1231, in-
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the distinction between claims of ignorance or mistakes of law and
mistakes of fact.48 Mistakes of pertinent fact were generally considered to provide a defense, while mistakes of law generally were not.49
Early commentators on the English maxim defended it on the
same rationale that the Romans had employed: the law was “definite
and knowable” so it was fair to demand the compliance of anyone
who possessed sufficient capacity to know it.50 While the very young
and the mentally incompetent were afforded some latitude for error
under this rationale, all other subjects of the realm were obligated to
know the law, and presumed to do so.51 Later, however, as reflected
by the passage at the start of this Article,52 British legal theorists began to offer utilitarian rationales for the principle—the fear that
volved a defendant who attempted to defend against a charge of trespass on the ground that he
had wrongfully been advised by counsel that the land was his own. The court held that this was
no defense. See id. at 78.
48. See Hall & Seligman, supra note 4, at 643 (“The clear-cut distinction which has existed
for centuries in the English law between the effect of a mistake of fact and a mistake of law
does not come from the Roman law.”).
49. The distinction was emphasized in CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAIN, DIALOGUES
BETWEEN A DOCTOR OF DIVINITY AND A STUDENT IN THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Robert
Clarke & Co., 1886) (1518):
Ignorance of the law (though it be invincible) doth not excuse as to the law but in few
cases; for every man is bound at his peril to take knowledge what the law of the
realm is . . . but ignorance of the deed, which may be called the ignorance of the truth
of the deed, may excuse in many cases.
Id. at 248-49. Although the distinction may thus be critical to an accused’s defense, attempts to
differentiate between mistakes of law and fact have frequently been fraught with difficulty. A
classic example involves a bigamy prosecution of a man who remarries, believing in error that
his first marriage is no longer binding. Is the man’s error one of fact or law? Courts striving to
elude the harsh effect of the maxim may tend to call it a mistake of fact, see, e.g., Long v. State,
65 A.2d 489, 498-499 (Del. 1949) (holding that a factual error about the dissolution of marriage
provides a defense), while others may find it a mistake of law, see, e.g., Staley v. State, 131
N.W. 1028 (Neb. 1911) (holding that the defense is not available even where defendant had
been advised by three different lawyers that his former marriage was incestuous and void);
State v. Woods, 179 A. 1 (Vt. 1935) (holding that an error about the validity of a divorce is no
defense). The Model Penal Code proposed that the distinction between mistake of law and mistake of fact claims be abolished, on the theory that both kinds of error eliminate culpability
equally. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 cmt. 1 at 270 n.2 (1985). The debate about the wisdom
of the law and fact distinction is beyond the scope of this Article.
50. This sentiment appears in myriad early sources. See ST. GERMAIN, supra note 49, at
248 (“[E]very man is bound at his peril to take knowledge what the law of the realm is . . . .”); 1
SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 42 (London, E. Rider 1800) (1680).
51. See 1 HALE, supra note 50, at 42:
Ignorance of the municipal law of the kingdom, or of the penalty thereby inflicted
upon offenders, doth not excuse any, that is of the age of discretion and compos
mentis, from the penalty of the breach of it; because every person of the age of discretion and compos mentis is bound to know the law, and presumed so to do . . . .
52.

See supra text accompanying note 1.
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without the maxim the defense of ignorance of the law would be
abused (all would claim ignorance to avoid punishment) and the concern that feigned claims would be impossible to refute.53
Despite the English devotion to the ignorantia legis maxim, important (though limited) exceptions to the maxim existed under English law, just as they had under Roman law. One scholar noted: “In
both [the Roman and English] systems considerations of equity induced the courts to deviate from the rule if arising cases did not expressly warrant its application.”54 Departures were also granted in
criminal cases when the doctrine of mens rea required that they be,
such as when particular specific intent crimes required proof of an intent that was negatived by the accused’s lack of knowledge of his culpability.55
C. The Maxim in the United States
The ignorantia juris maxim currently in place in the United
States grew out of this venerable ancestry. Broad and early acceptance of the maxim is found in numerous cases.56 As with the Roman
53. John Austin, for example, proposed that the maxim was justified by the utilitarian
need to avoid the intractable problems of proof that would otherwise accompany every criminal prosecution. See 1 AUSTIN, supra note 44, at 498 (“Whether the party was really ignorant of
the law, and was so ignorant of the law that he had no surmise of its provisions, could scarcely
be determined by any evidence accessible to others.”). Under this view, were it possible to
plead ignorance of the law as a defense, there would be nothing to prevent every accused from
claiming it—“But, I did not know the law!”—and conferring upon the hapless prosecutor the
difficult task of disproving a negative—“You did!”
54. Bolgar, supra note 39, at 636; see also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 182, at 180 (Little, Brown, and Co. 14th ed. 1918) (1835) (“Equity always
relieves against a mistake of law when the surrounding facts raise an independent equity in behalf of one suffering through the mistake.”).
55. See Bolgar, supra note 39, at 633. An exception might also be made where the accused
“could not possibly have known of [the criminal statute’s] existence.” Peter Brett, Mistake of
Law as a Criminal Defence, 5 MELB. U. L. REV. 179, 187 (1966).
56. See, e.g., Respublica v. Negro Betsey, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 469 (1789) (Bryan, J.) (granting
a writ of habeas corpus and holding that a slave owner who failed to register the name of child
slave by the statutory cut-off date was not excused by his ignorance of the law that set the
date); The Cotton Planter, 6 F. Cas. 620 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810) (No. 3270) (holding that ignorance
of an act laying an embargo was not an excuse once the act was made known to the local customs collector); The Ann, 1 F. Cas. 926, (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 397) (holding that ignorance
of an act laying an embargo was not an excuse from the time of the act’s passage); United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 182 (1820) (Livingston, J., dissenting) (arguing that
while no one may allege ignorance of the criminal code under which they live, one may allege
an ignorance of the law of nations, with its many writers, different languages, and often differing views); Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833) (holding that a mistake of
law does not excuse forfeiture of sugars which were believed to be refined sugars under the

DAVIES TO PRINTER

354

03/22/99 12:51 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:341

and British versions, the American version of the principle was frequently articulated in lofty terms: every man “of reasonable understanding is presumed to know the law, and to act upon the rights
which it confers or supports,” and “it is culpable negligence in him to
do an act . . . and then to set up his ignorance of law as a defence.”57
Legal theorists continued to study the maxim and proposed
three additional rationales in its support. Rejecting Austin’s argument that problems of proof justified the maxim,58 Oliver Wendell
Holmes proposed an alternative utilitarian rationale: “[T]o admit the
excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker
has determined to make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side
of the scales.”59 In Holmes’s view, punishing offenders who acted in
ignorance of the law would achieve optimal societal knowledge of,
and compliance with, the law. Thus, adherence to the maxim would
promote a culture of legal literacy, while a retreat from it, even if in
the interests of individuated justice, would give rise to a community
of legal simpletons.

statute, but were not); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910)
(“[I]nnocence cannot be asserted of an action which violates existing law, and ignorance of the
law will not excuse.”); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925) (“All
persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes and must take note of the
procedure adopted by them . . . .”). State courts were in accord. See, e.g., Ryan v. State, 30 S.E.
678, 680 (Ga. 1898) (holding that while an accused’s ignorance of the law does not excuse, an
accused can also not use the victim’s ignorance of the law as a defense).
57. 1 STORY, supra note 54, § 209, at 212; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Andre
Limozin (Dec. 22, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 451 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,
1955) (“[I]gnorance of the law is no excuse in any country. If it were, the laws would lose their
effect, because it can always be pretended.”).
58. Holmes challenged the suggestion that an accused’s ignorance of the law would be
more difficult to establish than other required elements, and argued that any proof problems
could be remedied simply by shifting the burden to establish such ignorance to the accused. See
HOLMES, supra note 4, at 48.
59. Id. In the modern administrative state, of course, the Holmesian view would have to
be broadened to take stock of the vast complex of lawmakers at work today—the state and federal legislatures that enact laws, the administrative agencies that implement those laws and
promulgate governing regulations of their own, and the courts that interpret and add meaning
to those statutes and regulations. Viewed in this light, an updated version of the Holmesian justification might look something like this: To admit the ignorance of law excuse at all would be
to encourage ignorance when a host of state and federal legislatures, administrative agencies
and courts have determined (although not always consistently with each other) to make us
know and obey. For an excellent refutation of the Holmes justification, see Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—but Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1997).
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Professor Jerome Hall later challenged Holmes’s view60 and proposed that the maxim was justified by a more fundamental rationale—the rationale of legality. Hall contended that ignorance of the
law claims could not be permitted for to do so would contradict the
principle of legality, elevating offenders’ perceptions of the law above
the law itself.61 Under the legality principle, when an accused fails to
know that her conduct violates a law, whether because she failed to
inform herself of the law’s existence or its application to her behavior, or because she misunderstood or disagreed with its prescribed
meaning, the law should be unforgiving.62
Finally, Professor Henry M. Hart postulated that the “essential
rationale” of the “much misunderstood” maxim is that any member
of the community who engages in intrinsically wrongful, prohibited
acts “without knowing that they are criminal is blameworthy, as much

60. Hall rejected the suggestion that the maxim was either designed to, or capable of
“stimulat[ing] legal education.” Hall, supra note 4, at 17. As he put it, “[T]here is not the slightest evidence that the generality of men study the criminal law in order ‘to know and obey it.’
The deterrent theory . . . reflects an over-simple, intellectualistic psychology that hardly comes
into contact with the actual springs of moral conduct and conformity with penal law.” Id. at 18.
Hall also refuted Austin’s argument that difficulties associated with disproving claims of ignorance necessitated the rule, though somewhat less vehemently. See id. at 16-17 (writing that,
while Austin’s theory “ha[d] much to recommend it,” in many cases it would be possible to disprove a claim of ignorance simply by establishing the accused’s access to the law, by, for example, establishing that the accused had subscribed to a newspaper that published the law governing his conduct).
61. See id. at 18-19. As Professor Hall so eloquently put the point:
Now comes a defendant who truthfully pleads that he did not know that his conduct
was criminal, implying that he thought it was legal. This may be because he did not
know that any relevant legal prohibition existed (ignorance) or, if he did know any
potentially relevant rule, that he decided it did not include his intended situation or
conduct (mistake). . . . If that plea were valid, the consequence would be: whenever a
defendant in a criminal case thought the law was thus and so, he is to be treated as
though the law were thus and so, i.e., the law actually is thus and so. But such a doctrine would contradict the essential requisites of a legal system, the implications of
the principle of legality.
Id. at 19. Hall explained the legality rationale in several steps. First, because penal rules are
“unavoidably vague,” Hall reasoned that it would be possible to “disagree indefinitely” about
what the law requires. Id. at 18. Second, the interest in legal order requires that the meaning of
penal rules be resolved one way or the other to allow or proscribe certain conduct. Third, once
“competent officials” after a “prescribed procedure” declare what the meaning of a law is, “the
debate must end.” Id. at 19. “[T]hese, and only these interpretations are binding, i.e., only these
meanings of the rules are the law.” Id. (emphasis added).
62. See id. at 19:
[T]here is a basic incompatibility between asserting that the law is what certain officials declare it to be after a prescribed analysis, and asserting, also, that those officials must declare it to be . . . what defendants or their lawyers believed it to be. A
legal order implies the rejection of such contradiction.
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for his lack of knowledge as for his actual conduct.”63 Using murder
as an example of such an inherently wrongful act, Hart argued that
even if an offender somehow lacked knowledge that the murderous
act violated a specific criminal law, her conduct would still be blameworthy and deserving of criminal punishment as much because she
did not know that murder was wrong as because she took another’s
life.64 Hart warned, however, that the maxim should only be applied
to rules that adequately reflect community attitudes or needs; it
should not be applied to an individual who offends a statute that
punishes conduct that is malum prohibitum (conduct that is wrong
only because it is illegal) rather than conduct that is malum in se
(conduct that is intrinsically wrongful).65
American courts have never agreed on a single rationale for the
maxim. Some courts have applied the maxim to preclude mistake of
law claims on the ground that such claims would arrest the administration of justice and provide a “shield for the guilty.”66 Other jurists
have cited the Holmesian view that the maxim is needed to promote
knowledge and compliance with the law.67 Still others have espoused
Hall’s principle of legality rationale, arguing that departures from the
doctrine would undermine “core standards of criminal behavior” that

63. Hart, supra note 4, at 413.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 419:
If . . . the criminal law adheres to this maxim when it moves from the condemnation
of those things which are mala in se to the condemnation of those things which are
merely mala prohibita, it necessarily shifts its ground from a demand that every responsible member of the community understand and respect the community’s moral
values to a demand that everyone know and understand what is written in the statute
books.
Some scholars disagree. Professor Kahan has argued that even a person who violates in ignorance a malum prohibitum offense, may properly be punished provided that “her conduct reveals that she is insufficiently committed to the moral values that the law reflects.” Kahan, supra note 59, at 146; see also Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997)
(challenging the assertion that regulatory crimes are morally neutral or less culpable than mala
in se crimes). While Professor Hart acknowledged that in some circumstances a failure to determine the legality of one’s conduct prior to acting might be culpable in and of itself, this was a
culpability of “a very distinctive kind” which could be treated and punished as a separate
crime—“the crime of ignorance of the statutes or of their interpretation.” Hart, supra note 4, at
419.
66. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1,
at 586 (1986) (citing cases).
67. See, e.g., People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1069 (N.Y. 1987).
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the criminal law strives to secure.68 It is also not uncommon for combinations of the various rationales to appear in a single judicial opinion.69
The inability of American jurists and commentators to agree on
a single rationale for the maxim has not precluded its application in
the United States, but it may help to explain the growing number of
cases that have departed from the maxim over time. Notwithstanding
the wide variety of rationales that have been used to support the application of the maxim in the United States, courts have also deviated
from the maxim, just as their forebears had done, when evidence of
bona fide ignorance or mistake has made criminal conviction (to
them) unfathomable, or the law itself has required forgiveness of an
accused’s legal error. Thus, the courts have sometimes (though not
uniformly) held that an accused’s ignorance of or mistake about a law
is excusable if she fairly relied on some erroneous advice from an official responsible for interpreting or enforcing that law.70 Ignorance or

68. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
The principle of legality rationale is detectable in early American case law as well. See, e.g.,
United States v. Learned, 26 F. Cas. 893, 896 (E.D. Mich. 1870) (No. 15,580) (“No man has a
right to set up a construction of the law for himself, and then plead it in justification of his violation of the law.”); The Sarah B. Harris, 21 F. Cas. 441, 442 (D. Me. 1867) (No. 12,344) (holding
that a defendant’s ignorance “as to the true construction of the law, cannot change the law and
make an act legal and valid, which otherwise would be invalid”).
69. For example, a blend of the Austinian and Holmesian rationales is detectable in Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404 (1833), an opinion crafted by Justice Story. “There is
scarcely any law which does not admit of some ingenious doubt,” wrote the Justice, “and there
would be perpetual temptations to violations of the laws, if men were not put upon extreme
vigilance to avoid them.” Id. at 411. This statement reflects both the Austinian fear that, if
permitted, mistake of law claims would clog the courts, and the Holmesian concern that a rule
permitting mistake of law claims would encourage law-breaching rather than law-abiding behavior.
70. A classic example of an unexcused act of reliance on mistaken official advice can be
found in Hopkins v. State, 69 A.2d 456 (Md. 1950). Reverend Hopkins sought and obtained the
advice of a local prosecutor regarding a sign he wished to erect which advertised, among other
things, his parish and notary public services. A state statute forbade the erection of any sign
“intended to aid in the solicitation or performance of marriages.” Id. at 458. The reverend
erected the sign after the state’s attorney advised him that it would not violate the statute. Subsequently, however, Hopkins was prosecuted and convicted under the provision. On appeal,
Hopkins argued unsuccessfully that he had reasonably relied on the state’s official interpretation of the law. The appellate court rejected the defense, holding that “advice given by a public
official, even a State’s Attorney, that a contemplated act is not criminal will not excuse an offender if, as a matter of law, the act performed did amount to a violation of the law. . . .
[I]gnorance of the law will not excuse its violation.” Id. at 460. But see Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559, 571 (1965) (holding that an accused’s due process rights may be violated if he is convicted “‘for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to him’”
(quoting Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959))).
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mistakes of law might also be forgiven if it is determined that the accused reasonably relied on a statute or judicial precedent later repealed or overturned,71 or if the legislature failed to make the law
adequately known or knowable.72
A number of jurisdictions have expressly provided that ignorance of the law will excuse if the actor acted in reasonable reliance upon an official interpretation of the official or
agency charged by law with the responsibility of interpreting the law defining the offense. See,
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-206 (Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-504 (1998); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-6 (West 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-220 (Michie 1994); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-8 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3203 (1995); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 501.070 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 36 (West 1983); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 562.031 (West 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-4 (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 15.20 (McKinney 1998); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.03 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-2-304 (1995); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (1985); 2 PAUL ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 183, at 386 (1984 & Supp. 1999) (citing cases and statutes). For an
excellent discussion of the defense of reasonable reliance on official interpretations of the law,
see John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L.
1 (1997).
Reliance on the advice of one’s own counsel or private counsel has not received similar treatment. An accused will not normally be excused for violating a law on the ground that
she relied on her own erroneous interpretation of the governing statute, even if that interpretation is reasonable. See, e.g., People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987) (denying a mistake of law claim raised by a corrections officer charged with possessing a loaded weapon without a permit, despite evidence that the officer erroneously believed peace officers were exempt
from liability under the statute). Reliance on advice of private counsel is generally viewed with
equal suspicion. See DRESSLER, supra note 38, § 13.02[B][3], at 152.
71. A number of jurisdictions provide that ignorance of the law will excuse if the actor
acted in reasonable reliance upon a statute, afterward determined to be invalid, or a judicial
decision decided by the highest state or federal court that was later reversed or overruled. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-2-6 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-206 (Michie 1997); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1-504 (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-6 (West 1994); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 702-220 (Michie 1994); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-8 (West 1993); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3203 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.070 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 36 (West 1983); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.031 (West 1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:2-4 (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20 (McKinney 1998); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (1985). Similar sentiments can be found in early case law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bergner & Engel Brewing Co., 260 F. 764, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1919) (stating that
although “[t]he principle of law, voiced in the legal maxim that ‘ignorance of the law excuses
no one,’ is a necessary doctrine . . . no one possessing any degree of intellectual honesty can
deny that all doubts of what is the law should be authoritatively settled, in order that the law
may be obeyed”). An accused’s reliance on an erroneous administrative decision, however,
may lead to less satisfactory results. See, e.g., Rothman v. United States, 270 F. 31, 37 (2d Cir.
1920) (holding that the defendant’s reliance on an erroneous decision issued by the Treasury
Department provided him no excuse).
72. Several states recognize a mistake of law defense if the law was unavailable to the accused at the time of the offense conduct. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 70, § 182(c), at 383 n.7
(1984) (collecting statutes). The drafters of the Model Penal Code also proposed such a provision. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(a) (1985). This type of mistake claim may also have
constitutional dimensions. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957) (holding that a
conviction under a malum prohibitum municipal ordinance violated the defendant’s due proc-
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An additional important subset of cases deviating from the
maxim—and indeed, the cases with which this Article is primarily
concerned—consists of decisions in which courts countenance ignorance or mistake of law claims because the claims disprove an element of the offense the prosecution is obligated to establish.73 These
cases make clear that ignorance of the law will excuse if the law itself
permits it to do so. Put another way, the law itself may impose upon a
prosecutor the obligation to prove an accused’s knowledge of the law
as a specific element of a particular offense before a conviction may
stand for its violation.74 For this reason, the statement “ignorance of
the law does not excuse” is decidedly deceptive. A more precise
statement of the maxim would be: “ignorance of the law is no defense
unless the law under which an accused is prosecuted makes knowledge
75
of the law an element of the offense.”
Determining when the law does this can be a formidable task. As
a matter of democratic theory, because Congress, rather than the judiciary, makes the laws, Congress must decide whether an offender’s
ignorance of the law will or will not provide a defense for each federal criminal enactment. When Congress makes its intentions clear,
the task of interpreting the statute should be relatively straightforward. Problems arise when congressional intent is less evident. The
less clear Congress’s intent, the more daunting the courts’ interpretive task becomes. In such situations, however, the maxim itself can

ess rights where the government could show neither that defendant had knowledge nor probability of knowledge of the ordinance). Although some commentators hoped that cases like
Lambert would expand the situations in which mistake of law claims could be made, see, e.g.,
Bruce Grace, Note, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1402 (1986),
the courts have confined the decision to its facts, perhaps proving correct Justice Felix Frankfurter’s famous quip that the majority’s opinion would become “a derelict on the waters of the
law.” Lambert, 355 U.S. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Golitschek, 808 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[W]hen the
law makes knowledge of some requirement an element of the offense, it is totally incorrect to
say that ignorance of such law is no excuse or that everyone is presumed to know such law.”).
74. See generally 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 66, § 5.1, at 575 (“[I]gnorance or mistake
as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if it negatives a mental state required to establish a material element of the crime . . . .”).
75. The term “defense” in this context quite loosely refers to the establishment of the
prosecution’s failure of proof. Although the defendant would bear the burden of producing
evidence of his purported mistake of law, and thus in this sense is properly referred to as a defense, that burden is minimal since the prosecution is never relieved of the burden of persuading the finder of fact that the prescribed culpability of all elements of the offense have been
established beyond a reasonable doubt. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (1985). For a helpful discussion of the operation of the burden of production for failure of proof defenses and
mistakes of law that negate offense elements, see 1 ROBINSON, supra note 70, §§ 4(a)(2), at 62.
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be thought of as a helpful rule of construction that favors a particular
outcome (that knowledge of illegality will not be an element) in the
absence of evidence that Congress desired a different result.
To illustrate, when a court is called upon to interpret a statute, it
faces three distinct possibilities: (1) that Congress intended that an
accused’s lack of knowledge of the law would not be an excuse; (2)
that Congress intended that an accused’s lack of knowledge of the
law would be an excuse; and (3) that Congress did not decide
whether an accused’s lack of knowledge of the law would be an excuse. Given the centrality of the ignorantia legis maxim to American
criminal jurisprudence,76 one would expect the vast majority of federal criminal statutes to fall into the first category. Put slightly differently, unless a criminal statute’s language or legislative history plainly
reflects a congressional intent that knowledge of that law is an element of the crime, one must presume the opposite intent—a congressional desire to adhere to the maxim.77 By contrast, an express statement (either on a statute’s face or in its legislative history) that
knowledge of the law is an element of the offense would plainly put a
statute into the second category.78 Finally, in rare situations, Congress
might prohibit (or require) certain conduct without deciding or

76. One of the Model Penal Code’s provisions on mistakes of law illustrates this centrality:
“Neither knowledge nor recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an
offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or the Code so provides.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9) (1985).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971)
(holding that the statute authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to promulgate
regulations governing the transportation of certain corrosive liquids and to impose criminal
penalties on those who “knowingly violated” those regulations required proof that the defendant knew the nature of his acts, not proof that he knew his acts violated the regulations).
78. One example is found in a provision of the federal firearm laws that prohibits the sale
of firearms by a licensed dealer of one state to residents of another state unless the dealer complies with the laws and published ordinances of both states. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3) (1994).
The statute provides an affirmative defense based on the accused’s lack of knowledge of a
state’s laws. See id. (stating that dealers “shall be presumed . . . in the absence of evidence to the
contrary to have had actual knowledge of the State laws and published ordinances of both
States”) (emphasis added). Other statutes allow conviction without proof of knowledge of the
law, but prohibit the accused’s imprisonment if she can establish that she lacked such knowledge. An example is provided by a section of the Federal Securities Exchange Act which specifies that “no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any
rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff (1994). Still other statutes, although facially silent, reflect congressional intent to provide
a mistake of law defense in their legislative histories. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the legislative history of the Child Support Recovery Act).
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reaching a consensus as to whether ignorance of the statute or regulation governing the conduct would provide an excuse.79
Surprisingly, the cases reviewed in Part II reveal that courts have
increasingly read criminal statutes containing the term “willfully” to
evidence a congressional intent that knowledge of that law must be
proved.80 While in theory the maxim should discourage such a construction without clear evidence of congressional intent, even in the
absence of such evidence (and, in some cases, despite plain evidence
to the contrary) courts have “found” such intent lurking in a host of
criminal statutes. In short, although many consider the maxim to be
the dominant rule, recent case law suggests that, even if this is true
for now, it may not be for long, particularly in prosecutions brought
under statutes containing language of willfulness.
II. THE “JURISPRUDENCE OF WILLFULNESS”
This Part considers the Supreme Court’s treatment of the maxim
in early tax evasion cases, as well as in three cases decided in the last

79. In such situations, it might be appropriate for the courts to construe the statute in favor
of such a defense under other rules of construction such as the rule of lenity, but not always.
Why? Because sometimes the legislative history of a statute will both make it clear that Congress included a particular mens rea term without reaching agreement on its meaning, and that
Congress intended the term to be interpreted under “general principles” of statutory construction, such as the ignorantia legis maxim. It would be error to apply the rule of lenity to favor a
mistake of law defense in such a case. For example, in a slightly different context, when Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992
(1994), it prohibited the “knowing” transportation, treatment, storage or disposal of any
“hazardous waste.” 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1994). No provision in the RCRA defined the term
“knowing” and legislative history of the Act made it clear that this was an intentional omission.
The Senate Report discussing the term forthrightly acknowledged that Congress had “not
sought to define ‘knowing,’” but rather that it preferred to leave “that process . . . to the courts
under general principles.” S. REP. NO. 96-172, at 39 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5019, 5038 (emphasis added). Courts that have construed the same word in the Clean Water
Act, see 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) (1994), have repeatedly rejected arguments that the language requires proof that a violator acted with knowledge of the particular regulation or law
offended. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 261-62 (4th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 715-16 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 537-40
(2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1283-86 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Int’l
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. at 563 (holding that the same language contained in the Interstate Commerce Commission regulations would not be interpreted to require proof of
knowledge of the law because it was “too much to conclude” that by employing the mens rea
language Congress intended to “carv[e] out an exception to the general rule that ignorance of
the law is no excuse”).
80. A smaller number of courts have reached the same result by construing other mens rea
language, particularly the phrase “knowingly violates.” See supra note 27.
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decade—Cheek v. United States,81 Ratzlaf v. United States82 and Bryan
83
v. United States —all of which depart from the maxim. Each case
centered on the proper construction of the scienter term “willfully” in
a criminal statute. In each case, the Court construed the term to require proof of the accused’s knowledge of the law. This Part also examines the decisions of lower federal courts in the wake of these recent Supreme Court holdings.
Through these decisions the courts have created a series of factors that they now routinely use to construe the term “willfully” to
make knowledge of the law an element of a crime.84 The decisions
make clear that, in a statute requiring “willfulness,” the presence of
any one of the factors can trump the old maxim. Indeed, the factors
are so powerful that courts have used them to justify outright refusals
to consider legislative history in construing the mens rea term.85 Collectively, the cases establish that “willfully” may impose a knowledge
of the law requirement:
1. when the term appears in a statutory scheme the court
finds extremely “complex” or “technical”;86
2. when the term appears in a statute that the court finds
could punish persons with “non-nefarious” motives;87
3. when the term appears in a statute that contains more
than one mens rea term, which compels the knowledge of
the law construction to avoid “surplusage”;88 or
4. (less often) when the term appears in a malum prohibitum
criminal statute.89
81. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
82. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
83. 118 S. Ct. 1939 (1998).
84. These “factors” are conceptually different from the “exceptions” described in Part I of
this Article. As discussed above in text, the American courts sometimes made an exception to
the maxim in cases charging crimes that required proof of an accused’s specific intent. Contrary
to the maxim, a specific intent to violate the law might have to be established in such a case.
Depending on their construction, criminal statutes employing the mens rea term “willfully”
may or may not impose a burden on the prosecutor to prove that specific intent. This Part describes the factors that courts have developed to help decide whether “willfully” should be so
construed in individual cases.
85. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147-48 (finding it unnecessary to consider legislative history to
determine the meaning of “willfully”); United States v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309, 312-14 (7th Cir.
1994) (choosing to focus on statutory text rather than on inconclusive legislative history).
86. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.2.
87. See infra Part II.B.1.
88. See infra Part II.C.1.
89. See infra Part II.C.3.
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Some courts have gone further and suggested that the term should be
read to impose a knowledge of the law requirement whenever it appears in a criminal statute.90
The combined force of these judicially created factors has deeply
wounded the ignorantia legis maxim. A careful review of these cases
reveals that while these factors may appear objective, singly and collectively they establish no consistent, principled standards for determining when Congress intended ignorance or mistake of law to provide an excuse. Instead, the word “willfully” has become an open
invitation for courts to impose their own subjective judgments about
when knowledge of the law should or should not have to be proved.
A. The Presence or Absence of Statutory Complexity
1. The Tax Cases. In a long line of cases beginning in 1933 with
91
United States v. Murdock, the Supreme Court repeatedly rejected
arguments by the government that the maxim should preclude violators of the federal tax code from claiming that their ignorance or
misunderstanding of the tax provisions excused their violations. In
Murdock, Harry Murdock had refused to answer the questions of a
suspicious Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent about deductions
that Murdock had claimed on his tax returns, on the ground that answering would tend to incriminate him under state law. He was later
prosecuted for the misdemeanor of “willfully” refusing to give testimony and supply information to the IRS relating to his claimed deductions.92 Although Murdock’s invocation of the privilege was improper (because the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination did not then protect against probable incrimination under state law), his error in asserting it was also reasonable, as the law
regarding the assertion of privilege was not well settled at the time of
the invocation. Nonetheless, the trial court refused to instruct the
jury that it could decide whether Murdock had acted willfully by considering whether he had invoked the privilege “in good faith and
based upon his actual [mistaken] belief” that he was entitled to do
so.93 The jury convicted, and that verdict was upheld on appeal.

90. See infra Part II.C.2.
91. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
92. See id. at 391.
93. Id. at 393. Instead of giving this instruction, the trial judge told the jury that he believed that the government had proven Murdock’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Prior to Murdock, in civil contexts, courts had often construed
the term “willfully” to mean “intentionally, knowingly, or voluntarily” and not applicable to an act performed by accident or mistake.94
Proof that the accused had engaged in the conduct purposely and
with knowledge of the physical facts of her prohibited behavior normally satisfied this standard. In criminal contexts, however, some
courts had placed additional qualifiers on the term, variously defining
it to require proof of an act done with “bad purpose,”95 without valid
excuse,96 stubbornly,97 or less often, without cause to believe in its legality.98
On a grant of certiorari, Murdock argued that the trial court
erred in its charge on the meaning of the statute’s scienter requirement. Murdock contended that the term “willfully” implicitly created
a mistake of law defense, and that his mistake (his erroneous but reasonable belief that the Fifth Amendment entitled him to refuse to answer the agent’s questions) prevented any conclusion that he had
“willfully” failed to supply the requested information to the agent.
Despite the strikingly different ways in which the term had been defined over time, the Murdock Court agreed with Murdock’s claim,
finding it implausible that Congress would have inserted the word
“willfully” into the tax statute unless it had meant to exempt genuine
mistakes about the law’s requirements. As the majority wrote:
94. See, e.g., Humbrid Cheese Co. v. Fristad, 242 N.W. 158, 161 (Wis. 1932); Hiatt v. Tomlinson, 158 N.W. 383, 385 (Neb. 1916); Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Nash, 27 N.E. 564, 564
(Ind. App. 1891).
95. Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206, 220 (1838) quoted in Spurr v.
United States, 174 U.S. 728, 734 (1899); Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 446 (1894); Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 702 (1877).
96. See, e.g., Felton, 96 U.S. at 702; Williams v. People, 57 P. 701, 702 (Colo. 1899); People
v. Jewell, 101 N.W. 835, 836 (Mich. 1904).
97. See State v. Harwell, 40 S.E. 48, 48 (N.C. 1901).
98. See, e.g., Hateley v. State, 118 Ga. 79, 81 (1904) (holding that “willfully” in a penal
statute generally means with a bad or evil purpose or without ground for believing the act to be
lawful). Under this early definition, the law might forgive a defendant who acted in reasonable
error about some legal privilege, particularly if the mistake could be characterized as a mistake
of fact, as opposed to a mistake of law. For example, in State v. Savre, 129 Iowa 122 (1905), the
court held that an accused could plead mistake in a prosecution that charged him with
“willfully” voting in a precinct other than that in which he resided if he believed in error that he
was entitled to vote in that precinct. See id. at 131. The court stressed, however, that if the mistake of the accused “was one of law solely” the mistake would provide no excuse for “every
one is presumed to be as familiar with the election laws as with others.” Id. But because “[t]he
determination of a person’s place of residence is often difficult, and frequently depends upon
nice distinctions and complicated questions of law and fact,” id. at 134, a mistake claim could
be offered by an accused, particularly where his mistake about his entitlement to vote was
based in part on erroneous advice received from three attorneys.
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Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a
return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should
become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the pre99
scribed standard of conduct.

The same was held to be true for the separate offense of failing to
supply information to the IRS.100 To be willful, such omissions required proof that the accused acted with an “evil motive,”101 which
prevented the conviction of any person who failed to comply with the
requirements of the tax code due to ignorance or a genuine mistake
about his liabilities or obligations under the code.102 Thus, contrary to
the trial court’s charge, a mistaken but genuine belief that the law did
not require him to supply information to the IRS should have prevented Murdock from being convicted.
The Murdock exception to the ignorantia legis maxim emanated
from the concern that errant, but sincerely perplexed, taxpayers
could be branded criminals if the maxim precluded their mistake of
law claims. The tax provisions were simply too voluminous and complex to justify imposing criminal liability upon every person who
might in good faith miscalculate her tax obligations.103 The sheer size
of the group that would be affected by a more severe reading—
virtually every wage earner in the country—demanded a policy more
forgiving of innocent error. Based on this reasoning, the Court construed the word “willfully” to limit the number of convictions of alleged tax offenders. As the Court later held, the errors of “the wellmeaning but easily confused, mass of taxpayers” would not be
“willful,” whereas the errors of the “purposeful tax violator” would.104
Finders of fact were to separate the “good guys” from the “bad guys”
by determining whether an accused’s failure to comply with the tax
code was driven by an “evil motive.”105

99. Murdock, 290 U.S. at 396.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See id. Although the Court appears to have toyed with the idea of construing
“willfully” in the misdemeanor tax provisions to require proof of something slightly less than
the proof of “evil motive” or “bad purpose” required in felony tax prosecutions, see Spies v.
United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943), it ultimately rejected the idea. See United States v.
Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 353-56 (1973).
104. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 361.
105. The “evil motive” formulation resurfaced in later tax cases. See, e.g., id.
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Murdock’s “evil motive” or “bad purpose” formulation was no
model of clarity. What kind of evidence was needed to show that a
tax defendant’s conduct was driven by an “evil motive” rather than
innocent error?106 Through a series of cases, the Court gradually answered this question by shifting from the “bad purpose” formulation
of Murdock to a “voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty” test.107 Throughout the tax decisions that followed Murdock,
the Court repeatedly stressed the complexity of the tax code as the
basis for its construction of the willfulness term.108

106. One possible answer was that proof of “positive knowledge of violation” was required.
See Mark D. Yochum, Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse Except for Tax Crimes, 27 DUQ. L.
REV. 221, 225 (1989). A nonexhaustive list supplied in a later decision suggested that the
Court’s standard would be satisfied by evidence of a wide array of deceptive behavior, including keeping two sets of books, making false entries, creating false invoices or other documents,
or concealing or destroying incriminating evidence. See Spies, 317 U.S. at 499. Thus it appeared
that the requisite evil motive could be demonstrated with any proof, direct or circumstantial,
establishing that the accused knew of his obligation to supply certain information to the IRS
but purposefully failed to do so. Put slightly differently, the “evil motive” test required proof
both that an accused was aware of his tax obligations and that he intentionally failed to meet
them.
107. The Court construed the word “willfully” in the tax evasion statute to connote a
“voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty” for the first time in United States v.
Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973). Even in Bishop, however, the Court continued to employ the
Murdock “evil motive” formulation. Still later, in United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10
(1976), the Court moved even further away from the “evil motive” or “bad purpose” formulation in favor of the “voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty” test. In a per
curiam opinion, the Pomponio Court emphatically denied that willfulness in the tax statutes
“require[d] proof of any motive other than an intentional violation of a known legal duty.” Id.
at 12. It was not until 1991, however, in Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), that the
Court seemed fully to cast off the “evil motive” construction. See id. at 200 (noting that the
Bishop decision had “refined” the Murdock “bad purpose” formulation). See also Yochum,
supra note 106, at 225 n.19.
108. This point was made most clearly in Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943), in
which Justice Jackson wrote:
[T]he [tax] law is complicated, accounting treatment of various items raises problems
of great complexity, and innocent errors are numerous, as appears from the number
who make overpayments. It is not the purpose of the law to penalize frank difference
of opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care. Such errors are corrected by the assessment of the deficiency of tax and its collection with
interest for the delay.
Id. at 496 (footnote and citation omitted). See also Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199-200:
The proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the
average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws. Congress has accordingly softened the impact of the commonlaw presumption [that every person knew the law] by making specific intent to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses.
See also Bishop, 412 U.S. at 360-61:
In our complex tax system, uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow the law. . . . The Court’s consistent interpretation of the word
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An important issue raised by the complexity rationale remained
unresolved, however, until late in the century—does a tax defendant’s claim of ignorance or error have to be objectively reasonable
to entitle her to an acquittal? If not, the government is presented
with two potential problems—the tax evader and the tax protester.
The tax evader could avoid punishment by feigning ignorance of the
law, and the government would have to prove knowledge of a complex statute, a potentially difficult task. The tax protester, who is
acutely aware that the government expects her to pay taxes, but who
believes that the government lacks legitimate authority to compel her
to do so, could defend herself in a tax prosecution simply by expressing her honest belief.109 One way to limit the ramifications of the
relaxation of the maxim would be to require citizens to make at least
minimally reasonable efforts to know the law. Unreasonable mistakes of law would be punishable while reasonable mistakes would
not. A later decision adding to the Court’s “jurisprudence of willfulness,” however, foreclosed this possible limitation on what was
widely perceived at the time to be a special tax exception.
In Cheek v. United States,110 the Court rejected the government’s
argument that a tax protestor’s purported mistake about his tax duties had to be reasonable to provide a defense. The case involved the
noncompliant conduct of John Cheek, a pilot for American Airlines,
who, after years of faithfully filing tax returns, suddenly refused to
file them. At his trial for willful tax evasion, Cheek claimed that he
had sincerely, though mistakenly, come to believe that his wages
were not considered taxable income under the Internal Revenue
Code, and therefore he had no duty to declare them.111 Cheek further

‘willfully’ to require an element of mens rea implements the pervasive intent of Congress to construct penalties that separate the purposeful tax violator from the wellmeaning, but easily confused, mass of taxpayers.
109. This example highlights the double hardship the tax exception imposes on the ignorantia legis principle. The force of the maxim is not only erased in such cases, it is positively
reversed. Why? Because whenever knowledge of illegality is construed to be an element of an
offense, the government is at once deprived of the traditional conclusive presumption that all
citizens know the law and simultaneously saddled with a presumption that the defendant did
not, which it must then rebut beyond a reasonable doubt. This is due to the presumption of innocence that adheres in all criminal prosecutions. Thus, in any criminal tax case, with knowledge of illegality as an element to be proved, the prosecutor must overcome a presumption that
the accused did not know of her tax obligations or liabilities to win a conviction.
110. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
111. There was ample evidence in the record to belie Cheek’s mistake claims. The evidence
at trial revealed that Cheek had become a seasoned tax protestor. On several occasions prior to
his indictment, Cheek had sued his employer and the IRS for withholding and failing to refund
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claimed to believe that, even if the code declared wages to be income,
any such declaration was unconstitutional. Over the defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury that Cheek’s purported beliefs had to be reasonable to constitute a valid mistake of law defense.112 Cheek was convicted on all counts.
On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court found the trial
court’s “willfulness” instruction deficient, and remanded the case for
a new trial. The Court reaffirmed that the tax evasion statute’s element of “willfulness” required proof of a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty,”113 but held further that an honest but
unreasonable mistake about one’s tax obligations or liabilities was
sufficient to preclude conviction.114 In the Court’s view, even an objectively unreasonable belief about the tax code might impermissibly
cloud an accused’s understanding of his legal duty to declare wages as
income.115 In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized yet

taxes on his wages, respectively. See id. at 195 n.3. The claims were disallowed by the IRS and
the private suits for damages dismissed as frivolous. Cheek was required to pay costs and attorneys fees ($1,500) and Rule 11 sanctions ($10,000). See id. Although the amount of the district
court’s sanction was later reduced to $5,000, the Court of Appeals agreed that the claim was
frivolous, and imposed an additional sanction of $1,500. See id.
112. The district court instructed the jury that “[a]n honest but unreasonable belief is not a
defense and does not negate willfulness,” and that “[a]dvice or research resulting in the conclusion that wages of a privately employed person are not income or that the tax laws are unconstitutional is not objectively reasonable and cannot serve as the basis for a good faith misunderstanding of the law defense.” Id. at 197.
113. Id. at 201. Under this definition, two types of delinquent taxpayers could elude criminal conviction—those who accidentally failed to comply with the tax code due to mistake or
other innocent reason (i.e., those who did not intentionally violate the provisions) and those
who intentionally failed to file a return or supply required information to the IRS, due to an
erroneous belief that they had no duty to do so (i.e., those who could not be said to have intentionally violated a known legal duty). A person who planned to pay her taxes but who inadvertently failed to notice that the deadline for filing a return had come and gone, would fall into
the former category. A person who believed in error that she was not required to declare wages
as income would fall into the latter. In both cases, the individuals would be allowed to assert an
ignorance of the law defense to a criminal prosecution for willful evasion of the payment of
taxes, although they both might be subject to civil penalties.
114. See id. at 202.
115. The Court was less forgiving of Cheek’s purported belief that provisions of the tax
code were unconstitutional as applied to him and thus could not validly impose upon him a
duty to file returns. See id. at 204-06. That mistake, wrote the majority, arose not from an
“innocent mistake[] caused by the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code,” but from
Cheek’s “full knowledge of the provisions” and his “studied conclusion, however wrong, that
those provisions [were] invalid and unenforceable.” Id. at 205-06. Because this second claim
merely expressed Cheek’s personal disagreement with (not lack of understanding of) the
Code’s demands, it was “irrelevant to the issue of willfulness and need not be heard by the
jury.” Id. at 206.
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again that the basis of the willfulness construction lay with the complexity of the tax laws.116
In summary, Murdock and its progeny established a special exception from the maxim for tax cases based on complexity. In this
limited form, the tax exception provided a consistent and straightforward rule upon which Congress could rely when including
“willfulness” language in other criminal tax provisions: because of the
complexity of the Internal Revenue Code, the term would be construed to require proof of knowledge of the law violated. Throughout
the tax decisions, however, the Court continued to stress the importance of the ignorantia legis maxim to the criminal law.117 These
maxim-affirming statements sent a powerful message: they emphasized the narrowness of the tax exception. In effect, the tax cases
were the exception that proved the maxim and thereby reassured
Congress that the maxim would continue to govern statutes that penalized willful misconduct unrelated to taxation.
2. The Complexity Genie Escapes the Tax Bottle. Even after the
Court carved the tax exception out of the maxim, the general
public—and many others better versed in the law—continued to
believe that the courts remained faithful to the ignorantia legis
principle.118 The historical lore surrounding the maxim continued

116. See id. at 199-200. Justice Blackmun strongly disagreed that complexity supplied a reason to overturn Cheek’s conviction, arguing Cheek’s claim of error related to “the income tax
in its most elementary and basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer and are wages income?”
Id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Professor Yochum has made a similar, colorful argument:
In the Jazz Age there was a sense that, in the bustle of more significant enterprise, an
otherwise honest citizen or, perhaps, even a jurist, could just forget to pay his tax.
Here, in the late twentieth century, it is impossible to believe that anyone with income of any significance does not know the government will take some share, and
even aliens must know April 15 is our day of reckoning.
Yochum, supra note 106, at 226.
117. See, e.g., Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199 (“The general rule that ignorance of the law or mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system.”).
118. Professor Meir Dan-Cohen has argued that the public’s belief that the maxim accurately states a firm legal principle, despite evidence that the courts have often managed to
avoid the “harsh results that strict adherence to the maxim would entail,” results from the
processes of “acoustic separation” and “selective transmission.” Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 646
(1984). Professor Dan-Cohen argues that where the achievement of one goal of the criminal
law (for example, “encourag[ing] people to be diligent in their efforts to know the law”), id. at
648, is “severely compromised” by widespread public knowledge of a second goal (for example,
the judicial policy of permitting legal ignorance as an excuse out of “considerations of justice”),
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unabated as one generation dutifully passed it on to the next. Courts
routinely depicted the tax exception as extremely narrow in scope,
and rejected efforts to extend the reasoning of Murdock and Cheek
beyond the tax arena.119 They reemphasized statutory complexity, and
in particular the complexity of the tax code, as the basis for
construing “willfully” to require proof of knowledge of the law. The
Supreme Court’s pro-maxim rhetoric also fueled the belief that,
outside the tax context, the maxim was a fundamental (if not
inviolate) and binding principle of the criminal law. One court wrote,
when rejecting a mistake of law claim in a non-tax case, that the
Court “crafted a narrow exception, limited to tax cases, in which
subjective mistake of law can constitute an absolute defense,”120 and
that “[n]owhere in Cheek, or the Court’s earlier opinions involving
criminal prosecutions under the tax laws is there any indication that
courts should use a purely subjective standard in evaluating state-ofmind defenses under other federal statutes.”121
Contrary to the popular belief that the tax cases represented the
only crack in the ignorantia legis edifice, however, careful inspection
of judicial decisions occurring between Murdock and Cheek reveals
the law may seek to achieve both goals though a complimentary process of “acoustic separation.” Id. Professor Dan-Cohen explains:
Absent acoustic separation, these rules would be in conflict: the force of the duty to
know the law would probably be severely compromised by public knowledge of the
existence of a decision rule that excused offenses committed in ignorance of the law.
In a world of partial acoustic separation, however, the law might try to serve the
policies of both the conduct rule and the decision rule by approximating as closely as
possible the imaginary world’s complete acoustic separation. It would do so by attempting to convey to the general public a firm duty to know the law and by simultaneously instructing decisionmakers to excuse violations in ignorance of the law if
fairness so required. It would also attempt to keep those two messages separate by
employing a strategy of selective transmission.
Id. at 648; see also Yochum, supra, note 106, at 222-23 (“[P]eople know (because all know the
maxim) that shady behavior may lead to jail in spite of the cry, ‘I didn’t know it was against the
law.’”).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
Cheek does not apply to willfulness element of the false statement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(1988)); United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 500 (1st Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply Cheek to
currency transaction report provisions); United States v. Caming, 968 F.2d 232, 240-41 (2d Cir.
1992) (rejecting argument that all crimes requiring proof of willfulness require proof of knowledge of illegality, and reading Cheek to control only tax prosecutions); United States v. Gay,
967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to apply Cheek to mail and property fraud charges);
United States v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 446 n.25 (5th Cir. 1992) (refusing to apply Cheek to
making false statements on bank records); see also Michael L. Travers, Comment, Mistake of
Law in Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1304 n. 23 (1995) (citing cases refusing
to extend Cheek into areas other than federal tax crimes).
120. Aversa, 984 F.2d at 500.
121. Id. (citations omitted).
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signs of the maxim’s slow but certain decay.122 Citing the tax decisions
as support, some lower courts began to construe “willfully” to
authorize a departure from the maxim on the basis of statutory complexity in non-tax cases as well.123 Even the courts that rejected such
mistake claims reinforced the idea that complexity could provide the
basis for a mistake of law defense outside the tax field, by denying
the claims on the ground that the violated statute was not sufficiently
complex,124 rather than on the ground that the complexity exemption
was confined to tax prosecutions. These decisions expanded the tax
precedents (which had provided a consistent and uncomplicated rule
upon which Congress could rely in drafting statutes) to create a rule
that turned on the complexity of the statute in question, as opposed
to the inclusion of the term “willfully” in a tax provision.125
This expansion of the Murdock and Cheek tax exception might
have been tolerable had “complexity” actually meant something, but
none of the tax decisions had given content to the term. Perhaps this
was because the complexity of the tax law was deemed too obvious to
122. See, e.g., United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1976)
(reversing conviction for willfully exporting ammunition where the trial court did not require
the government to prove that the defendant knew that his conduct violated the law). The Supreme Court itself held in a civil, non-tax case decided only five years after Murdock that
“willfully” “‘means purposely or obstinately and is designed to describe the attitude of a carrier, who, having a free will or choice, either intentionally disregards the statute or is plainly
indifferent to its requirements.’” United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 243 (1938)
(quoting St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. United States, 169 Fed. 69, 71 (8th Cir. 1909)); see also Citron v. Citron, 722 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1983), (holding that civil liability for allegations of unlawful wiretapping demanded the same level of proof required in criminal proceedings, i.e., proof
of a voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty); Malouche v. JH Mgmt. Co.,
Inc., 839 F.2d 1024, 1026 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that liability for unlawful wiretapping requires
proof of criminal willfulness). Although scholars have failed to note the especially dramatic
change in the courts’ approach to constructions of “willfully,” a few legal writers have taken
note of the courts’ steady, if hushed, movement away from the ignorantia legis principle in tax
and non-tax prosecutions. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 118, at 646-47 (noting that, in order to
avoid harsh results, courts do not strictly adhere to the maxim “ignorance of the law is no excuse”); Bolgar, supra note 39, at 640 (recognizing ignorantia legis as “more a means for balancing considerations of equity than a basis for strict judicial interpretation”); Brett, supra note
55, at 197 (noting that “mistake of law” cannot be applied indiscriminately to every situation).
123. See, e.g., Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d at 828 (“Rely[ing] upon the interpretation by
the courts of the term ‘willful’ in the Revenue Acts.”).
124. See United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the aiding
and abetting provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994) are “quite uncomplicated” and thus knowledge of illegality need not be proved); see also infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text
(discussing other examples).
125. See, e.g., Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d at 828 (holding that a defendant must understand that his action is unlawful, and that mere negligence with regard to statutory interpretation does not constitute “willfulness”).
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require explanation. More likely, the lack of explanation was due to
the fact that, when created, the complexity exception was really just a
special tax exception, so an explanation of what made a statute complex was not necessary.126 Whatever the reason, “complexity” was a
hollow formulation, and lower courts that considered complexity
challenges in later non-tax prosecutions were left without guidance as
to what made a statute sufficiently complex to warrant departure
from the ignorantia legis maxim.
Without sufficient guidance to cabin the application of the factor, judicial perceptions of “complexity” were certain to vary, and indeed a body of law soon emerged that displayed no consistent or
principled basis for calling one statutory scheme “complex” and another not. For example, one court declared “quite simple” the provisions of a federal statutory scheme that prohibited large-scale distributions of contraband cigarettes, despite the fact that the statute
made reference to state regulations that were not reproduced in the
body of the federal criminal statute but were relevant to a finding of
federal criminality.127 Another found that a criminal provision in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)—a statute that
has sent shivers of fear and uncertainty up many a practitioner’s

126. The notion that the Murdock exception was really a tax exception and not a broader
“complexity” exception is supported by later cases which applied the exception even to fairly
straightforward claims of error. Cheek is a good example.
127. See United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1492 (9th Cir. 1995). The Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act (CCTA) made it unlawful “for any person knowingly to ship, transport,
receive, possess, sell, distribute, or purchase contraband cigarettes.” 18 U.S.C. § 2342(a) (1994).
The term “contraband cigarettes” was defined in a separate convoluted provision to include
quantities of cigarettes “in excess of 60,000” which bore “no evidence of the payment of applicable State cigarette taxes in the State where such cigarettes” were found, “if such State require[d] a stamp, impression, or other indication to be placed on packages or other containers
of cigarettes to evidence payment of cigarette taxes, and which are in the possession of any person other than” a person defined by the CCTA as being exempt from the provision. Id. §
2341(2). Although the language of section 2342 appears to require only that the shipment or
transportation or other distribution be “knowing,” the court declared without explanation that
“the statute requires willfulness,” Baker, 63 F.3d at 1491, and proceeded to consider whether
the complexity of the state cigarette tax provisions in combination with the federal contraband
cigarette prohibition made the scheme so complex that proof of knowledge of illegality was
required. See id. After simply paraphrasing the federal statutory language, and neglecting entirely the language of the state cigarette tax provisions which interfaced with the federal law,
the court concluded that the statute was not sufficiently complicated to warrant a departure
from the maxim. See id. at 1492 (“The law is quite simple. All cigarettes in quantities exceeding
60,000 which are brought into the state must either be stamped or preapproved by the state’s
Department of Revenue.”).
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spine—contained no inherent complexity.128 Yet another court held
that proof of knowledge of the law was required in a prosecution
brought under a federal statute that prohibited the “willful” exportation of certain ammunition,129 because the types of ammunition controlled by the statute were listed not in the statute itself, but in a
regulation published in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).130
These rather inconsistent decisions demonstrate that the
“complexity” genie, once released from the tax bottle, would grant or
withhold the mistake of law defense based solely on the desires of the
court before which the issue appeared. “Complexity” would be found
to exist or not depending on the result each court wanted to reach.
Thus, in the contraband cigarette prosecution, it made no difference
that criminality derived from the intersection of two separate provisions located in two different statutory or regulatory sources. That
fact did not render the criminal statute so complex as to require proof
of knowledge of the law. Yet in the criminal exportation case, the
same fact made conviction impossible without proof of the accused’s
knowledge of the law. Neither of these decisions reflect a genuine
search for legislative intent underlying the word “willfully.”
“Complexity,” it seems, is in the eye of the judicial beholder.
B. Concern for the “Non-Nefarious” Actor
In a recent case, the Supreme Court confirmed that even outside
tax cases, the word “willfulness” could require knowledge of the law.
Without offering any guidance to the federal courts still struggling
with the question of complexity, the Court conjured up a second
128. See United States v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 1565, 1584 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that there is
nothing inherently complex about the criminal enforcement provision of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §
1131 (1994)).
129. See 22 U.S.C. § 1934(c) (1994).
130. See Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d at 828; accord United States v. Hernandez, 662 F.2d
289, 292 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the willfulness term in 22 U.S.C. § 1934(c) required proof
that defendant violated a known legal duty because the weapons covered by the statute were
“spelled out in administrative regulations”); United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir.
1978) (following the Lizarraga-Lizarraga analysis of “willfulness” in the same statute). These
decisions do not explain why it should matter that the prohibited items were enumerated in the
CFR rather than the United States Code, but they implicitly suggest that the physical separation of mutually dependent provisions make an accused’s knowledge of the law less likely, and
thus the chance of innocent error more likely. This reasoning is curiously reminiscent of the
legal fiction that the law is “definite and knowable.” See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
It suggests that had the listed items been enumerated in the statute itself, as opposed to in the
plainly referenced regulation, the defendant’s violation would have been “willfully” committed
and rightfully punished.
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quasi-objective factor that could be used to construe “willfully” to
provide a mistake of law defense—concern for the non-nefarious actor.
1. Ratzlaf v. United States. In Ratzlaf v. United States,131 a case
brought under the federal anti-structuring rules,132 the Supreme Court
applied a Cheek-like construction of willfulness in a non-tax setting
for the first time. Under federal law, financial institutions are
required to report cash transactions exceeding $10,000.133 To
discourage private individuals from attempting to frustrate the
reporting requirements imposed on financial institutions, Congress
passed a separate provision, 31 U.S.C. § 5324, which prohibits any
person from structuring a financial transaction for the purpose of
evading those reporting obligations.134 At the time of Ratzlaf’s
prosecution, a related penalty provision (since amended) in the same
title authorized the imposition of a jail term and a criminal fine upon
anyone who “willfully violate[d]” section 5324.135
As in Cheek, the issue before the Ratzlaf Court was whether the
trial judge had properly instructed the jury on the meaning of
“willfully.” Rejecting Ratzlaf’s proffered instruction,136 the trial court
had charged the jury that “willfully” required the government to
prove that Ratzlaf had known about the reporting obligations and
had attempted to evade them, but not that he had been aware that efforts to evade the requirements were unlawful. Because there was no
131. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
132. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5324 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
133. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1994) (requiring reporting of transactions exceeding an
amount set by regulation); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1998) (setting the reporting requirement at
$10,000).
134. At the time of the alleged offense, the section provided: “No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a) . . . (3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions.” 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988) (amended 1994). Section 5322(a) further
provided: “A person willfully violating this subchapter or a regulation prescribed under this
subchapter . . . shall be fined not more than $250,000, or imprisoned for not more than 5 years,
or both.” 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (1988). After the Ratzlaf decision, Congress amended the law to
require only an intent to avoid reporting a transaction. See Riegle Community Development
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 411, 108 Stat. 2253, 2253
(1994) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a), 5324(c)(1) (1994)). See also infra Part III.B.1.
135. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (amended 1994).
136. Ratzlaf asked the trial court to instruct the jury that a willful violation of the structuring law required the government to prove both that he had known of the federal reporting requirements imposed on financial institutions, and that he had known it was unlawful for him to
try to evade those reporting obligations. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 138.
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question that Ratzlaf had known of the reporting rules and had purposely acted to elude them,137 the instruction doomed any chance of
an acquittal.
Had the Court applied the rule of the tax cases—“willfully” in
tax statutes requires proof of knowledge of the law—then Ratzlaf
would have lost because the anti-structuring statute in question had
nothing to do with taxes. On the other hand, had the Court applied
the rule of “complexity” developed through the lower courts’ expansion of the tax cases—“willfully” in complex statutes requires proof
of knowledge of the law—then Ratzlaf still would have lost because
the anti-structuring statute was not complex.138 The Court did neither,
however, and Ratzlaf won. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that proof of Ratzlaf’s knowledge of the antistructuring prohibition was required to convict.
The Court offered two initial reasons for its decision—avoiding
“surplusage” and the construction that other courts had given the
word “willfully.” Neither of these provides persuasive support for the
Court’s result. As to surplusage, the Court reasoned that the trial
judge’s instruction reduced the phrase “willfully violating” to “words
of no consequence”139 because the charge required no more than
proof of the other scienter requirement contained in the statute—a
“purpose to evade” the reporting requirement.140 This rationale is dis137. Ratzlaf admitted as much. See id. at 140. Ratzlaf had offered over $100,000 in cash to a
Nevada casino to pay off a gambling debt and was advised by a casino official that the casino
would have to report the payment because it was in excess of $10,000. See id. at 137. This news
caused Ratzlaf to revise his method of payment. In a limousine on loan from the casino, Ratzlaf
engaged in a process known as “smurfing.” See Sarah Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and
the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287, 288
(1989). He toured the local banks where he purchased a number of cashiers’ checks, each just
shy of $10,000. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137. He then used those checks to pay off the gambling
debt. See id.
138. As put by one Justice, the exception from the maxim for tax prosecutions was ‘“largely
due to the complexity of the tax laws.”’ Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 156 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991)). Therefore, the exception was
“inapplicable” to the anti-structuring prohibitions, which, “far from being complex” were
“perhaps among the simplest in the United States Code.” Id. Indeed the Ratzlaf majority made
no suggestion that complexity was either central to its decision or a prerequisite to finding that
knowledge of the law was required. Late in the 1998 Term, however, the Court reemphasized
the centrality of complexity to constructions of willfulness. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing
Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939 (1998)).
139. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140. Ratzlaf’s mention of surplusage supports a third justification
for construing “willfully” to require proof of knowledge of the law. See infra Part II.C.2.
140. Despite its facial appeal, there is good reason to question the correctness of this conclusion. Professor Eskridge has observed that the legislative history of the anti-structuring provision “strongly suggests that Congress did not notice the ‘double scienter’ language, and did
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cussed separately below.141 As to the other rationale—the lower
courts’ collective judicial understanding of the term—the Court
claimed that, within the particular context of the anti-structuring
statute, the U.S. Courts of Appeals had “consistently” construed the
willfulness requirement under analogous provisions of the antistructuring laws to require proof of both a defendant’s knowledge of
and purpose to disobey the law.142 This conclusion is highly debatable.
Although the federal circuit courts had construed the “willfulness”
term in a number of analogous anti-structuring provisions to require
“proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the reporting requirement
and his specific intent to commit the crime,” they had not done so
with respect to the precise provision under which Ratzlaf had been
charged.143 Moreover, a closer reading of the holdings of the cases on
which the majority relied would have revealed the inherent ambiguity
in the federal courts’ prior constructions of the term “willfulness.”
This formulation of the government’s burden could be understood in
one of two ways: (1) the government had to prove that the defendant
was aware of the reporting rules and acted with a purpose to evade
those rules—in which case Ratzlaf was likely guilty; or (2) the government had to prove that the defendant knew about the reporting
rules, acted with purpose to evade them, and additionally knew that
attempts to evade the reporting rules were unlawful—in which case
Ratzlaf might not be guilty. Thus, contrary to the majority’s opinion,
the pre-Ratzlaf decisions had not clarified whether a defendant
merely had to know about the reporting requirements imposed on financial institutions before attempting to evade them, or whether, in
addition, the defendant had to know that his efforts to maneuver
around those requirements were prohibited. The Ratzlaf majority ignored the very real possibility that at least some of the federal circuit
courts had meant to require only the former showing, and construed
the willfulness term to require proof that Ratzlaf had known of both
the institution’s reporting requirement and of the law that prohibited
him from trying to evade that requirement.
not intend a double scienter requirement.” William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—Foreward: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 58 n.142
(1994) (citing Drug Money Seizure Act and The Bank Secrecy Act Amendments: Hearing on S.
571 and S. 2306 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong.,
141-42 (1986) (colloquy between Senator Alfonse D’Amato and a representative of the Department of Justice at a hearing prior to the adoption of the anti-structuring provision).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 147-51.
142. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140 (citing cases).
143. Id. at 153-54 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing cases).
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More importantly, if the views of the lower courts mattered at
all, then the Court ignored more relevant views than those courts’
general constructions of “willfulness” under the anti-structuring laws.
In considering the precise provision under which Ratzlaf was prosecuted, ten of the eleven U.S. Courts of Appeals had rejected claims
that the term “willfully” made knowledge of the reporting requirements an element of the offense.144
The real reason for the Court’s rejection of the trial court’s instruction lay elsewhere. The majority openly worried in its opinion
that the government’s preferred construction of the mens rea term
could lead to the punishment of “non-nefarious” as well as
“obviously evil” or “inherently bad” actors.145 For example, an estranged spouse wishing to conceal her assets might structure her
transactions, claimed the majority, and thereby unwittingly expose
herself to a structuring prosecution;146 the suggestion being that only
with specific knowledge of the anti-structuring prohibitions could
such a “non-nefarious” actor choose to avoid criminal liability. The
Court was particularly patient with and empathetic toward persons
who might “unexpectedly” find themselves under the purview of a
statutory or regulatory scheme that the Court concluded Congress intended for more diabolic actors.147 Yet, as pointed out by the dissent,
the majority’s concern for the vulnerability of the imaginary spouse
to prosecution seems misguided, and its description of the spouse’s
conduct too generous. Even assuming that the spouse’s conduct is not
worthy of condemnation,148 prosecution of the spouse for structuring

144. See id. at 153-54 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing cases). The majority dodged
the force of this near unanimous agreement among the circuits by finding that any such construction would render section 5322(a)’s willfulness requirement superfluous. See id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. See id. at 146.
146. See id. at 145.
147. The same concern appears in Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), a case involving the meaning of a separate mens rea term “knowingly.” There, the Court held that a
charge of knowing possession of food stamps “in a manner not authorized” by applicable federal regulations required proof that the accused knew his possession was unlawful. Id. at 426.
The Court reached this result on the ground that any other construction would “criminalize a
broad range of apparently innocent conduct.” Id.
148. This is a big assumption. Four dissenting Justices in Ratzlaf seemed to believe an intentional attempt to hide one’s assets from an ex-spouse would involve morally reprehensible
or “nefarious” conduct. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 155 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he antistructuring provision targets those who knowingly act to deprive the Government of information to which it is entitled. . . . [T]hat is not so plainly innocent a purpose as to justify reading
into the statute the additional element of knowledge of illegality.”).
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would fail on the facts of the majority’s hypothetical because the
prosecutor would not be able to establish that the defendant structured the transaction “with the purpose to evade” the reporting obligations of a financial institution. Indeed, the hypothesized purpose of
the secretive spouse would have been quite different from that which
Congress contemplated and proscribed. She would have structured
her transactions with the purpose to prevent information about her
financial affairs reaching her estranged spouse, not the federal government. Because financial institutions owe no reporting obligations
to warring spouses, at least within the meaning of the criminal structuring statute, the hypothetical spouse would have committed no
crime.149
The Court’s new factor—non-nefariousness—which justified
construing “willfully” to protect innocent actors, exhibited stark deficiencies even in the case that saw its birth. That is, it was plain that
the factor would permit ignorance of the law claims to be advanced
even by actors who fell outside the group of good citizens that the
Court was striving to protect. Ratzlaf’s own bank-hopping behavior,
for example, betrayed his non-innocent goal of concealing from governmental authorities the money that he had used to pay off gambling losses. The record even reveals his motive for doing so: he had
previously been audited by the IRS and continued to be under investigation for tax evasion.150 A suspected tax evader would have an excellent reason to hide his gambling debts—to hide the reportable income used to pay off those debts. Despite the fact that the
government’s proof at trial fully evidenced Ratzlaf’s awareness of the
casino’s reporting obligations, his purpose to circumvent those obligations, and his motive for doing so, the Ratzlaf majority remained
concerned that the statute could be used to overreach, to subject to
criminal prosecution more “innocent” transgressors of the structuring
rule.151 This groundless fear that the provision could potentially ensnare an unwitting “non-nefarious” actor thus permitted an actor
with patently “nefarious” motives to go free. Put another way, even
those whom the statute was plainly designed to reach—gamblers,

149. The Court’s proffered justifications for the structuring conduct of its imagined “nonnefarious” actors do not, however, persuade one that Congress would have agreed with the
Court’s assessment.
150. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 144 n.11.
151. The Court thought it important that the government brought no tax charges against
Ratzlaf. See id.
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racketeers and drug dealers—would stand to benefit from the majority’s creation of an ignorance of the law defense.
Not only did the Ratzlaf Court confirm that the willfulness exception was not limited to tax cases, it created a new factor that
would permit courts to decide cases subjectively,152 and without reference to sources evidencing legislative intent. According to the Court,
the mere inclusion of the term “willfully” in the text of the federal
anti-structuring law so unambiguously expressed Congress’s intent to
make knowledge of the law an element of the crime, that consultation of the statute’s legislative history was entirely unnecessary.
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg declared, “[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.”153 Im152. Very little consensus is detectable in the courts’ “feelings” about nefarious versus nonnefarious conduct. For a case construing a statute to punish non-nefarious conduct, see United
States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 1994) (“We see little difference between breaking a
cash transaction into segments of less than $10,000 [Ratzlaf’s offense conduct] and making a
[campaign] contribution in the name of another.”); cf. United States v. Macko, 994 F.2d 1526,
1532 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that because regulations governing commercial transactions with
Cuba or Cuban nationals “proscribe activity that is not generally perceived to be wrong . . .
‘willfulness’ . . . requires a finding of specific intent to violate the trade provisions”); United
States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387, 1391-92 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that an activity which is “not
generally criminal—travel to, from and within Cuba—[requires] an intentional violation of a
known criminal duty”). For cases construing statutes to punish only “inevitably” or
“inherently” nefarious conduct, see United States v. English, 92 F.3d 909, 915-16 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that proof the defendant knew the law was not required because defendant’s
scheme to defraud was inherently nefarious); United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir.
1997) (concluding that a defendant prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994), establishing accomplice liability for any crime committed against the United States, engaged in inevitably nefarious conduct because he could have been convicted only if the government had proven that
he had the guilty mental state necessary to violate the underlying criminal statute); United
States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that unlike the anti-structuring provision, the federal prohibition of the transportation or distribution of contraband cigarettes is
not a trap for the unwary innocent).
The Curran reasoning is the more problematic because the court substitutes its own
perception of wrongdoing for that of Congress. The Curran court concluded that a statute that
prohibited any person from causing a campaign treasurer to file a false report with the Federal
Election Commission might be used to punish non-nefarious actors unless it was read to have a
knowledge of the law element. See Curran, 20 F.2d at 568-69. The government alleged that
Curran had asked his employees to contribute to the campaign chests of various candidates,
and then had reimbursed them for the contributions. See id. at 562. By doing so, Curran exceeded the $1,000 limitation individual campaign contribution limit imposed by federal law.
Curran was charged with causing the employees to file false reports with the FEC. See id. Curran argued that the government had to show he knew his actions were unlawful. See id. at 563.
Relying on Ratzlaf, the Third Circuit agreed, finding that the campaign contribution disclosure
obligations paralleled the obligations of financial institutions to disclose deposits exceeding
$10,000, the statute criminalized conduct that was not “inherently evil,” and the statute was
regulatory. See id. at 567-69.
153. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147-48.
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plicit in this statement is the astonishing suggestion that the meaning
of the phrase “willfully violated” is somehow apparent on its face,154
yet rarely, if ever, had any previous court found the meaning of the
term “willfully” to be so obvious. Indeed, quite the contrary is true.155
By the time of the Ratzlaf decision, case reporters were brimming
with passages bemoaning the inherent obscurity of the word, particularly as it had been used in criminal statutes.156
Neither did the Court’s alternative justification—the rule of lenity157—strengthen its interpretive position. As a rule of statutory construction, courts will normally employ the rule of lenity only when
both a statute and its legislative history leave the law’s meaning ambiguous.158 Yet the Ratzlaf majority refused to give any weight to the
legislative history of the structuring provision, even while conceding

154. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 140, at 73 (describing the Ratzlaf Court’s plain
meaning analysis as “underwhelming”).
155. As might be expected of a term whose meaning appears to vary depending on the context in which it appears, and whose underlying rationale has never won a judicial consensus, the
chameleon-like properties of “willfully” have sorely tested the courts’ interpretive skills.
156. A colloquy between Judge Learned Hand and Model Penal Code Reporter Herbert
Wechsler regarding the inclusion of the mens rea term in the proposed Model Penal Code provisions epitomizes the opinion of the term held by many jurists and academics:
JUDGE HAND: It’s an awful word! It is one of the most troublesome words in a
statute that I know. If I were to have the index purged, “wilful” would lead all the
rest in spite of its being at the end of the alphabet.
MR. WECHSLER: I agree with you, Judge Hand, and I promise you unequivocally
that the word will never be used in the definition of any offense in the Code. But because it is such a dreadful word and so common in the regulatory statutes, it seemed
to me useful to superimpose some norm of meaning on it . . . .
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) cmt. 10 at 249 n.47 (1985) (citing A.L.I. PROC. 160 (1955)); see
also infra notes 226-35 and accompanying text (discussing the Model Penal Code treatment of
“willfulness” in greater detail); United States v. Ladish Malting Co., 135 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir.
1998) (“Willfully is a notoriously slippery term . . . .”); Perkins, supra note 4, at 49 (describing
the term as “elastic”). Indeed, Volume 45 of Words and Phrases, including the pocketpart, devotes 169 pages to cases variously employing the term. 45 WORDS AND PHRASES (perm. ed.
1970 & Supp. 1998).
157. The rule of lenity requires ambiguities within criminal statutes to be resolved in the
defendant’s favor. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978);
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 902, 1332 (6th ed. 1990). The Ratzlaf majority wrote that even if it
had found the willfulness requirement ambiguous, the rule of lenity would have demanded
resolution of any doubt about the term’s meaning in the defendant’s favor. See Ratzlaf, 510
U.S. at 148.
158. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 148; see also Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)
(“[T]he ‘touchstone’ of the rule of lenity ‘is statutory ambiguity.’” (quoting Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980))).
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that “contrary indications”—language that expressly contradicted the
Court’s preferred construction—appeared in the statute’s history.159
Although the full impact of Ratzlaf would only be felt later, as
courts applied its reasoning to a variety of other federal criminal
laws, the decision made additional departures from the maxim inevitable. The majority’s reasoning made the mens rea term “willfully” a
loaded one. First, the decision confirmed that, even outside the tax
code, the term could be construed to embrace a knowledge of illegality element and to elude the maxim’s application. At minimum, the
inclusion of the term in a criminal statute would appear to trigger an
inquiry into whether knowledge of the law had to be proved. Second,
the decision indicated that statutory complexity was not a condition
precedent to this construction of “willfully”; a showing that the statute might condemn non-nefarious conduct, as evaluated by the courts,
not Congress, would also suffice. Finally, the decision raised fundamental questions about institutional competency: who is to decide
whether particular conduct is worthy of criminal punishment? As a
matter of democratic theory, Congress enjoys this authority. Barring
constitutional error, once Congress deliberates upon and chooses to
outlaw particular acts, that legislative determination should be respected by the courts. The concern for the non-nefarious actor established in Ratzlaf allows courts to second-guess such legislative determinations and thereby undermines legislative primacy.
2. Bryan v. United States. The Supreme Court dished up
additional fodder on the questions of statutory complexity and nonnefarious actors in its 1998 decision Bryan v. United States.160 In Bryan
the Court once again considered the meaning of the term “willfully,”
which appeared in a statute that prohibited the sale of firearms by

159. In dissent, Justice Blackmun observed that statements in the provision’s legislative history plainly revealed Congress’s intent that knowledge of illegality would not be an element.
See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 158-160 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-746, at 1819 & n.1 (1986) and S. Rep. No. 99-433, at 22 (1986)). Statements included in the Senate Report that accompanied a bill resulting in the passage of a parallel anti-structuring provision
rendered further support for the view that the Ratzlaf provision was not intended to require
proof of knowledge of illegality. See id. at 158 (citing S. Rep. No. 99-433, at 7 (1986)). The
House Report addressing the parallel provision explained: “As is the case presently for structuring cases involving currency transaction reports, the government would have to prove that
the defendant knew of the . . . reporting requirement, but would not have to prove that the defendant knew that structuring itself had been made illegal.” Id. at 161 (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
102-28, pt.1, at 45 (1991)).
160. 118 S. Ct. 1939 (1998).
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any person who lacked a federal license.161 Bryan had been convicted
after a jury trial on charges of dealing in firearms without a federal
license and conspiracy to do the same.162 Although there was no
question that Bryan had in fact sold weapons without a valid
license,163 the government had no proof that he had known of the
federal licensing requirement.164
Relying on Ratzlaf, Bryan urged the Court to vacate his conviction on the ground that the government should have been required to
prove that he knew he needed a federal license in order to sell the
weapons.165 The government conceded that the term “willfulness” in
section 924(a)(1)(D) required some proof that Bryan had known his
conduct was unlawful,166 making the issue before the Court narrow:
did the “willfulness” term require proof that Bryan knew his conduct

161. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 924(a)(1)(D) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Congress
amended the firearms provisions when it passed the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986
(FOPA), Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, 456, which added mens rea requirements to the provisions. FOPA amended the penalty provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1) by adding the mens rea
requirements to punish certain acts or violations if committed “knowingly,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(1)(A)-(C), and all other violations if committed “willfully,” id. § 924(a)(1)(D). The
catchall provision in section 924(a)(1)(D) was applicable to the offense for which Bryan was
convicted—dealing firearms without a federal license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).
162. See Bryan, 118 S. Ct. at 1944.
163. The trial evidence definitively established that “straw purchasers” bought firearms in
Ohio for Bryan, that Bryan was not entitled to purchase the guns in Ohio himself, that Bryan
agreed to file off the serial numbers of the guns (presumably to prevent authorities from identifying their source), and that he later resold the guns on Brooklyn street corners without a federal license. See id. at 1944 & n.8.
164. See id.
165. The trial court had instructed the jury: “A person acts willfully if he acts intentionally
and purposely and with the intent to do something the law forbids.” Id. at 1944. Provided the
defendant acts with “the bad purpose to disobey or to disregard the law,” he need not be shown
to have been “aware of the specific law or rule that his conduct” violated. Id. This construction
of the law conflicted with the constructions of several federal circuit courts. The Eleventh Circuit had applied the “intentional violation of a known legal duty” test, which demanded proof
that the accused had known about the federal licensing requirement and had intentionally
failed to comply with it in order to convict. See United States v. Sanchez-Corcino, 85 F.3d 549,
553 (11th Cir. 1996). Several other circuits had reached similar results. See United States v.
Rodriquez, 132 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that proof that a defendant acted with
knowledge of the licensing requirement is necessary for conviction); United States v. Obiechie,
38 F.3d 309, 315 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that “willfully” requires knowledge of the law);
United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that an
“unknowing” act cannot violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)).
166. Rather than argue that the willfulness genie be put back in the tax bottle, the government settled on a less ambitious goal: to reduce its burden of proof as to knowledge of the law
elements.
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was unlawful generally, or did it require proof that he knew of the
specific federal licensing requirement?167
In a noticeable move away from the “intentional violation of a
known legal duty” test favored in Cheek, the Bryan majority reembraced the Murdock definition of willfulness. “As a general matter, when used in the criminal context, a ‘willful’ act is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose,’” 168 wrote Justice Stevens for the majority.
This required proof that the defendant had “acted with an evilmeaning mind,”169 which the Court defined as acting “with knowledge
that his conduct was unlawful.”170 The government did not, however,
need to show that the defendant knew of the specific licensing requirement he was charged with violating; proof that Bryan knew generally that his conduct was unlawful was sufficient.171
This holding seemed at odds with the rules of Cheek—which required proof that the defendant had known about and understood the
specific tax-related duty he was accused of violating172—and Ratzlaf—
which required proof that the defendant had been specifically aware
of the anti-structuring prohibition.173 Why would “willfully” in the
sale of firearms context require proof only of knowledge of general
illegality if “willfully” in the tax and anti-structuring contexts requires
proof of knowledge of a specific legal duty or prohibition? All three
statutes contained the troublesome mens rea term without defining it.
Thus, no textual basis existed to support the distinction. What, then,
could be the basis for the different interpretations?
The Court attempted to reconcile the holdings of the three important cases by once again highlighting the importance of statutory
complexity and non-nefarious conduct to constructions of
“willfulness.” Cheek and Ratzlaf were “readily distinguishable” from
Bryan, the Court wrote, because they “involved highly technical statutes that presented the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in
apparently innocent conduct” and thus justified “‘an exception to the
traditional rule’ that ignorance of the law is no excuse.”174 The sale of
167. See Bryan, 118 S. Ct. at 1942.
168. Id. at 1945 (quoting United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933)).
169. Id. at 1946.
170. Id. at 1945 (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)).
171. See id. at 1949.
172. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
174. Bryan, 118 S. Ct. at 1946-47 (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200
(1991)).
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firearms provision, however, warranted no similar exception because
it presented no danger of convicting “a defendant with an innocent
state of mind” once the jury found that Bryan knew that his conduct
was unlawful.175
These assertions are puzzling.176 While it is true that the Court in
Cheek and Ratzlaf had worried that the tax code and anti-structuring
provisions could be used to penalize actors who unwittingly failed to
heed legal duties or proscriptions, neither opinion suggested that the
behavior of John Cheek or Waldemar Ratzlaf was “innocent.”177
Rather, in both cases the Court’s concern was elsewhere—with the
possibility that other morally innocent actors might be ensnared by
the complex (Cheek) or relatively unknown (Ratzlaf) provisions in
the absence of a mistake of law defense.178 In addition, contrary to the
suggestion in Bryan, the Ratzlaf majority did not premise its holding
that the anti-structuring provisions required proof of knowledge of
the law on the ground that the provisions were so complex or “highly
technical”179 as to obscure understanding. As explained above, the
fundamental concern in Ratzlaf was with the punishment of nonnefarious actors who simply had no clue that their conduct was unlawful.

175. Id. at 1947 n.22.
176. Also bewildering is Justice Stevens’ statement: “[T]he willfulness requirement of
§ 924(a)(1)(D) does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law
is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required.” Id. at 1947. This
aspect of the Court’s opinion curiously harkens back to the common law’s “legal wrong” and
“moral wrong” doctrines. Under these common law doctrines, claims of ignorance commanded
no judicial sympathy if, despite the defendant’s lack of cognizance of some fact or law, his conduct was in some important respect legally or morally repugnant. The classic case is Regina v.
Prince, which involved a defendant who carried a girl out of the custody of her father while under the reasonable belief that she had reached the age of consent, provides a helpful example
of the doctrines in operation. See 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 154, 175-76 (U.K. 1875) (Bramwell, B.,
applying the moral wrong doctrine); id. at 160-62 (Brett, J., applying the legal wrong doctrine).
177. Indeed, the Court seemed openly skeptical of their innocence. “[T]he more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them
to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties . . . and will find that the
Government has carried its burden of proving knowledge.” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S.
192, 203-04 (1991).
178. See, e.g., Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199-200 (“The proliferation of statutes and regulations has
sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of the
duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws.”) (emphasis added).
179. Bryan, 118 S. Ct. at 1946-47. The majority engages in a rhetorical sleight of hand by
employing the term “highly technical” as opposed to “highly complex.” This may evidence its
desire to include the anti-structuring statute addressed in Ratzlaf within the complexity umbrella, a feat previously untried.

DAVIES TO PRINTER

1998]

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF WILLFULNESS

03/22/99 12:51 PM

385

What, then, can explain the Bryan Court’s surprising suggestion
that Ratzlaf was grounded on complexity? One possibility is that as
the Court was confronted with the pitfalls of the jurisprudence of
willfulness, its sympathy toward mistake of law claims diminished.
The inevitable drawback of any rule excusing criminal liability for a
lack of knowledge of the law is that such a rule celebrates ignorance
of the law while making knowledge of it the best and fastest ticket to
a prison cell. The compromise struck in Bryan—requiring the government to prove only general knowledge of illegality—may reflect
the Court’s growing recognition of this drawback.
It is possible, of course, that a more pragmatic concern might
also have prompted the Bryan majority’s abrupt reversion to the
Murdock “bad purpose” formulation—a reluctance to put an admitted gun runner back on the streets. Under Cheek’s “voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty” test, which forces the
prosecutor to establish the accused’s awareness of the specific duty
that provides the basis of the charge, Bryan most assuredly would
have gone free.180 The government had no hope of proving this specific knowledge in Bryan since it had no evidence that he knew of the
licensing requirement. The Court’s decision to employ the “bad purpose” test instead of the “voluntary and intentional violation of a
known legal duty” test, although understandable in light of the defendant’s flouting of other firearms rules, underscores the freewheeling and inherently contradictory nature of contemporary constructions of “willfulness.” Moreover, even if Congress had intended
the term to impose a knowledge of the law requirement in such
prosecutions, there is simply no support—in the text of the statute or
in the legislative history—for the majority’s conclusion that this requirement would be satisfied with proof of the accused’s knowledge
that he was violating some law, as opposed to the law under which he
was charged.181 This fact led the dissenting justices to conclude that
180. In Ratzlaf, the Cheek test would have necessitated proof that the defendant knew
about the statute that prohibited his structuring conduct. In Bryan, it would have necessitated
proof that Bryan knew about the (unsatisfied) license requirement that made his sales unlawful.
181. In dissent, Justice Scalia chided the majority for suggesting that proof of knowledge of
general illegality was sufficient to sustain a conviction under the firearms provisions. See Bryan,
118 S. Ct. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that under the majority’s reasoning a defendant would be guilty of the offense of selling firearms without a license even if he
had never heard of the license requirement, provided the government could show that he knew
that some aspect of his conduct was unlawful. That could include anything from knowing that
the law prohibited him from filing the serial numbers off of the guns he sold to knowing that he
was unlawfully double-parked while he sold them. See id. at 1950-51.
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the statute required even more—proof of Bryan’s knowledge of the
specific licensing requirement.
In summary, the Bryan decision continues the modern judicial
trend of defining criminal willfulness to require proof of knowledge
of illegality, but simultaneously reduces the rigorousness of the
prosecutor’s burden of proof.182 Having thus handed both the government and the criminal defense bar weapons that can be used in future battles over mistake of law claims, the Court has now only to
step back and watch the bloodbath that is bound to ensue. Although
the government technically “won” in Bryan (the defendant’s conviction was upheld), in the long run it can scarcely be pleased with the
weapon with which it has been left. True, the government need now
only prove knowledge of general illegality in the run-of-the-mill willfulness case, but this is a burden the ignorantia legis maxim never
thrust upon it. Moreover, in prosecutions brought under “highly
technical” statutes—whatever that phrase may turn out to mean—the
government’s burden will be significantly heavier. In the aftermath of

The majority opinion suggests that the term “willfully” will automatically trigger an
inquiry into whether knowledge of illegality is an element. See id. at 1945-47. It multiplies by
two the questions that a court reviewing a criminal statute with language of willfulness must
resolve. First, a court will have to decide whether the term is included in a “highly technical”
statute. See id. at 1946-47. Assuming that it is not (under the Court’s analysis, this should be the
larger group of cases), the reviewing court will then have to consider whether the government
has offered sufficient evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of general illegality. See id. at
1947. This requirement will inevitably raise additional questions about the quality of evidence
needed to satisfy such a burden of proof. What does it mean to say that a defendant was generally aware of the unlawfulness of her conduct?
182. Proof of the accused’s knowledge of general illegality will suffice unless the willfulness
term appears in a “highly technical” statute, that is, a statute likely to ensnare the nonnefarious (such as the tax code or, now, the anti-structuring provisions). By contrast, in cases
brought under the tax and anti-structuring laws (and similar hypertechnical laws that have yet
to be identified) proof of the accused’s knowledge and intentional disregard of a specific legal
duty will have to be offered. With this ruling, the Court moved even further away from any
genuine effort to divine the legislative intent underlying the inclusion of “willfully” in the sale
of firearms statute.
The Federal Courts of Appeals have developed another method to dilute the rule that
willfulness requires proof of a defendant’s knowledge of the law. Several courts have held that
an accused’s knowledge of the law can be proved by evidence that the defendant engaged in
the offense conduct with “reckless disregard of the law.” See, e.g., United States v. Briscoe, 65
F.3d 576, 587 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that evidence that defendant failed to make a reasonable
effort to ascertain whether his conduct would violate the law might suffice). One commentator
has suggested another possible method of softening the impact through redefinition of the mental state. If courts employed a requisite mental state of “acceptance,” then the government
could prove either that the defendant knew the law or that he was so indifferent to it that he
would still have acted had he known. See Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental
State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 961-63 (1998).
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Bryan, it is uncertain whether the Court will, over time, further
broaden the class of criminal statutes placing this heightened burden
on the government. The defense bar is likely to be more content with
its weapon. Bryan himself may have lost, but he secured for others
accused of willful criminal conduct a broad judicial statement that
“willfulness” generally will be construed to require proof of knowledge of the law. This statement reflects the judiciary’s continued disaffection with the ignorantia legis principle.
C. Other Rationales for Subverting the Maxim
1. The Problem of Surplusage. An additional factor offered in
support of the Ratzlaf decision has provided a third basis for
construing language of willfulness to require proof of knowledge of
the law—the problem of surplusage. The Ratzlaf Court advised that,
to avoid superfluity, courts might have to construe “willfully” to
confer a mistake of law defense if the term appeared in close
proximity to another scienter term.183 As then written, the penalty
provision of the anti-structuring statute specified penalties for any
person who “willfully violated” section 5324.184 Elsewhere, though,
section 5324 prohibited any person from structuring her transactions
with a “purpose of evading the reporting requirements” imposed on a
financial institution.185 The Court held that by instructing the jury that
the government had to prove only that Ratzlaf had acted with
purpose, the trial court treated the separate willfulness requirement
“essentially as surplusage” or as “words of no consequence.”186
This dislike of surplusage has provoked a number of decisions in
which the mere presence of both the word “knowingly” and the word
“willfully” in a single criminal provision has caused courts to infer
knowledge of illegality as an element,187 particularly in cases in which
one of the other factors, complexity or non-nefariousness, is also present. Although the concern over surplusage has some force, a rule of
183. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
184. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (1988) (amended 1994).
185. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a), (b) (1994).
186. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 (1994).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that Congress intended to distinguish between different levels of scienter when it employed both
“willfully” and “knowingly” in the firearms statute); United States v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309,
315 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that “willfully” must demand proof of knowledge of the law to
avoid being duplicative of the demands of “knowingly”).
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construction that automatically inserts such an element into every
criminal statute that pairs “willfully” with one or more other scienter
terms is fundamentally flawed. To get a full sense of the toll that such
a rule of construction would exact, it may be useful to consider the
panoply of federal criminal statutes that employ the two mens rea
terms in close proximity. Table 1 of the Appendix sets forth the results of a search of the United States Code for provisions containing
both “willfully” and “knowingly” as scienter terms.188 Even a swift
look through the table reveals the folly of interpreting all statutory
unions of “knowingly” and “willfully” to require proof of knowledge
of the law.
Suppose, for example, that a person is accused of violating 18
U.S.C. § 879(a), which makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully
threaten to inflict bodily harm on the President or a member of the
first family (past or present). Suppose further that the accused sent a
note to the President threatening his life but then claimed that she
believed (erroneously but honestly) that the law allowed her to do so.
Surely the linking of the two scienter terms in a single statute should
not automatically be construed to require proof that the accused
knew that she was violating the law, at least in the absence of some
clear legislative signal making such knowledge of the law an element.
The accused in this example is just as dangerous not knowing the law
as she is knowing the law. A much more plausible construction of the
term “willfully” in this context would require proof that the accused
acted purposively, and not by accident, mistake or other innocent
reason.
Some courts have recognized the difficulties that would be presented if they were to construe “willfully” to require proof of knowledge of the law every time the term appeared in a statute in conjunction with another mens rea term. For example, one court has held
that a surplusage problem is presented only where “willfully” modifies the word “violat[es]”189 as it did in Ratzlaf. This reasoning is specious for many of the reasons set out above. Table 2 of the Appendix

188. Using Westlaw, a May 1998 computer search of the “United States Code” database for
the phrase “knowingly and willfully” yielded 160 citations. Of these 160 uses of the clause
“knowing and willfully,” 89 related to civil provisions while the remaining 71 related to criminal provisions. The search did not include other mens rea terms with which “willfully” may be
closely linked.
189. See United States v. Daughtry, 48 F.3d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that where
“willfully” modifies the word “falsifies,” as in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001, no proof of knowledge of the
law is necessary).
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sets forth the results of a comprehensive search of the United States
Code for provisions containing the phrase “willfully violates” or
“willfully violating.”190 The search revealed dozens of criminal provisions employing the two terms in tandem. To be sure, Congress may
have intended the phrase to make knowledge of the law an element
in some of these statutes. Without a close examination of the legislative history of each of these statutes, however, any such conclusion
will be no better than judicial guesswork. Moreover, an approach that
simply assumes that the phrase is always used to exhibit such an intent is poor judicial guesswork at that.191 Were the courts to apply this
logic to all of the provisions in Table 2, they would have to conclude
that Congress has been routinely overriding the ignorantia legis
maxim for years without fanfare.
2. Mechanical Constructions of “Willfully.” Even more
troublesome are perfunctory rulings implying that “willfully” must
always be read to demand proof that a defendant intentionally
violated a known legal duty.192 Several courts have suggested that
knowledge of illegality or wrongdoing is an element whenever the
term “willfully” appears in a criminal provision. With little or no
analysis, for example, the term has been so construed under the
Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute193 and provisions
190. Using Westlaw, a May 1998 computer search of the “United States Code” database for
the phrase “willfully violates” or “willfully violating” yielded 137 citations. Of these statutes, 48
related to civil provisions; the remaining 89 related to criminal provisions and are listed in Appendix, Table 2.
191. The phrase “willfully violating” appeared in the anti-structuring statute that the government used to prosecute Ratzlaf. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1994). Congress has made clear that it
did not intend the phrase to require proof of knowledge of the law. See infra Part III.B.1.
192. See United States v. Garcia, 751 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985) (“In a criminal statute,
‘willfully’ generally means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty in bad faith
or with evil purpose.”).
193. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995). This decision
illustrates the mechanistic reasoning of some courts when construing the willfulness term and
the confusion generated by the Supreme Court’s willfulness constructions. The anti-kickback
provisions prohibit anyone from “knowingly and willfully” offering, paying, soliciting, or receiving remuneration (e.g., bribes or kickbacks) in exchange for referrals of Medicare or Medicaid patients or business. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) and (2) (1994). Relying on Ratzlaf, the
Hanlester court interpreted the willfulness term in the anti-kickback provisions to require proof
that an accused health care provider or supplier knew that the law prohibited its financial
dealings, and that the provider or supplier acted with the specific intent to disobey the law’s
commands. See Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1400. However, a second federal circuit court rejected this
construction and held that the term requires proof only that the accused knew his conduct to be
“wrongful.” See United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440-41 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[The] mens rea
standard should only require proof that [the defendant] knew that his conduct was wrongful,
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prohibiting the willful misapplication of federally guaranteed student
loan funds.194 Although Bryan should put to rest the view that
“willfulness” always means knowledge of the particular law at issue,
the decision’s broad language may validate the mechanistic view that
“willfully” requires proof of knowledge of some law. Justice Stevens’s
open-ended suggestion that whenever “willfulness” appears in a
“criminal context” it requires proof that an accused knew her
conduct was unlawful invites the argument that, even if the term does
not appear in close proximity to another scienter requirement, and
even if it does not modify the verb “violates,” it should be read to
make knowledge of the law an element.195
3. Inclusion of “Willfully” in a Regulatory or Malum
Prohibitum Statute. A number of federal courts have suggested a final
basis for construing “willfully” to require knowledge of the law—the
inclusion of the term in a regulatory or malum prohibitum, as
opposed to a malum in se, provision. The difference between the two
often seems deceptively straightforward. Mala in se offenses are
generally considered to criminalize inherently wrongful conduct.196 By
rather than proof that he knew it violated ‘a known legal duty.’”); see also United States v.
Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (declining to follow Hanlester by holding that
“willful” should be formulated as “the purpose to commit a wrongful act”); Medical Dev. Network, Inc. v. Professional Respiratory Care/Home Med. Equip. Servs., Inc., 673 So. 2d 565, 567
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (distinguishing banking statutes of Ratzlaf from anti-kickback statutes since the latter punish those who perform specific acts without requiring specific intent to
violate the statute). A third federal circuit court later affirmed jury instructions that defined
“willfully” to mean that the accused’s act “was committed voluntarily and purposely with the
specific intent to do something the law forbids . . . with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.” United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that Hanlester
requires mere knowledge of unlawfulness rather than specific knowledge of a particular statutory violation).
194. See United States v. Bates, 96 F.3d 964, 970 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]illful misapplication
under [the provision] requires the government to allege and prove that the defendant consciously, voluntarily, and intentionally exercised unauthorized control or dominion over
[student loan] funds . . . while knowing that such an exercise of control or dominion over the
funds was a violation of the law.”), aff’d, 118 S. Ct. 285 (1997).
195. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority: “As a general matter, when used in the criminal
context, a ‘willful’ act is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’ In other words, in order to establish a ‘willful’ violation of a statute, ‘the Government must prove that the defendant acted
with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.’” Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1945
(1998) (citations omitted) (quoting Heikkinen v. United States, 355 U.S. 273, 279 (1958) and
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)).
196. The paradigm example would be an intentional act of killing. Absent a socially acceptable justification or excuse, killing is universally considered to be morally wrongful, even in the
absence of legislative confirmation. Because mala in se crimes prohibit deviations from generally agreed upon norms of behavior, the offender is more likely to be aware that the conduct is
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contrast, mala prohibita offenses are generally considered to
criminalize conduct that is wrongful only because the legislature has
declared it to be so.197 Many argue that because mala prohibita crimes
are not inherently morally wrongful, they may also not be selfevident.198 For this reason, the argument goes, the imposition of
criminal punishment for a malum prohibitum offense is just only if
the offender is shown to have had actual knowledge (or at minimum,
good reason to know) of the law violated. Without such knowledge
the offender is denied the opportunity to choose between rightful and
wrongful conduct.199
Based on this reasoning, some courts have been especially willing to construe “willfully” to require proof of a defendant’s knowledge of the law in cases involving individuals accused of regulatory or
200
mala prohibita offenses, particularly when the offense statute proscribes activity “not known generally to be controlled by the government,”201 or when the items or activities covered by the proscriptions

wrongful, even if he is not aware that some provision in the penal code declares his conduct
criminal. The crime is in this sense self-notifying, and it is of no consequence that the killer is
unaware that the legislature has declared the conduct a crime. The offender can fairly be said
to have engaged knowingly (and perhaps even willfully) in inherently wrongful conduct because all members of the community would recognize the conduct to be wrong. Accordingly, it
is just to penalize him for choosing to engage in it.
197. An example might be a traffic law that makes it a crime (probably a misdemeanor) for
any person to drive on the “wrong side” of the road. Inherently, of course, there is no “right
side” of the road. The legislature simply chooses one side over the other, and declares it to be
so. Once the legislature has acted, however, the interest in vehicular and pedestrian safety
make it eminently fair and necessary to expect all drivers in the community to learn which side
of the road the legislature has deemed to be the “right side” and to abide by that rule. When a
driver fails to do so, she has committed the crime of driving on the wrong side of the road (or,
perhaps more popularly, negligent operation of a motor vehicle). Again, this is criminal behavior not because driving on that side of the road was the inherently wrongful choice, but because driving on that side of the road had previously been declared wrongful by a legislative
body charged with the responsibility of enacting such rules.
198. Numerous legal writers have made this claim. See, e.g., Hall & Seligman, supra note 4,
at 642; Grace, Note, supra note 72, at 1413; Travers, Comment, supra note 119, at 1324.
199. See Michael E. Tigar, ‘Willfulness’ and ‘Ignorance’ in Federal Criminal Law, 37 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 525, 526 (1989) (arguing that a system of criminal justice that metes out punishment without providing individuals the opportunity to choose between right and wrong, “gives
over the function of identifying targets of punishment to blind forces of fate or chance, or worse
yet, to malign vengeance-seekers”).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 570-71 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that to
prove that a defendant willfully caused election campaign treasurers to submit false reports to
the Federal Election Commission, a regulatory crime, the prosecution must prove defendant
knew of the treasurers’ reporting obligations, acted to circumvent those obligations, and knew
that his conduct was unlawful).
201. United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1978).
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are set forth in an administrative regulation as opposed to a criminal
statute.202 As with the judiciary’s other justifications for construing
“willfully” to signify a congressional desire to depart from the maxim,
however, any conclusion that such a construction is appropriate simply because the term appears in a malum prohibitum statute is fundamentally flawed for several reasons. First, the line between malum
in se conduct and malum prohibitum conduct is itself quite nebulous.203 Thus, it is unlikely to provide a sound basis for determining
when to construe “willfully” to impose a knowledge of the law element. Second, as in the “complexity” and “non-nefarious actor”
cases, the courts’ invocation of the malum prohibitum rationale has
been “selectively”204 employed, at best. This practice will inevitably
lead to a lack of uniformity in the treatment of defendants, and to a
basic incoherence in the law itself.
Third, there is little valid reason to believe that Congress intends
violations of mala prohibita statutes to be prosecuted less vigorously
than violations of mala in se statutes. Given the large number of mala

202. See, e.g., id. & n.2 (holding that a conviction for the willful exportation of a weapon on
the munitions list without an export license or written approval of the State Department requires proof that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal duty). But
see United States v. Weitzenhopp, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that knowledge
of illegality is not required under the Clean Water Act because it defines a public welfare offense). Courts have exhibited far less sympathy toward individuals who handle dangerous instrumentalities. By and large, knowledge of the law has not been required of persons who routinely handle dangerous devices, products or waste materials. See, e.g., United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) (concerning drugs); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971)
(dealing with hand grenades); United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S.
558, 564-65 (1970) (concerning sulfuric acid); see also id. (“Pencils, dental floss, paper clips
may . . . be the type of products which might raise substantial due process questions if Congress
did not require, as in Murdock, ‘mens rea’ as to each ingredient of the offense.”). Courts reason
that the nature of the dangerous instrumentality makes it so likely that the government will
have acted to regulate its possession, handling, or distribution that anyone in possession of such
an instrumentality may fairly be presumed to be aware of the regulation. See, e.g., id. at 565.
203. Stuart Green has argued for the abandonment of the distinction between mala in se
and mala prohibita offenses. As put by Professor Green, “[T]he most persistent criticism of the
malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction has been that it is notoriously difficult to determine
the category into which many crimes fit.” Green, supra note 65, at 1577. He argues further that,
even if we could agree that a particular crime was malum prohibitum, the violation of malum
prohibitum statutes often involves moral wrongfulness. See id. at 1572-79; see also Kahan, supra
note 59, at 150-51 (arguing the same). For both of these reasons, in a heavily regulated society
it may be easier to agree that conduct is immoral because it has been declared illegal, than to
agree that conduct is illegal because it is immoral.
204. Kahan, supra note 59, at 150 (“[I]t takes no real detective work to find cases that say
just the opposite—that ignorance of the law is no excuse ‘whether the crime charged is malum
prohibitum or malum in se.’” (quoting Blumenthal v. United States, 88 F.2d 522, 530 (8th Cir.
1937))).
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prohibita statutes now on the books, acceptance of this notion would
require one to believe that Congress had envisioned, but not bothered to broadcast, that scores of departures from the maxim would
occur under these statutes. Without stronger evidence of Congress’s
disenchantment with the maxim, this notion is unsupportable.
Moreover, although the application of a malum prohibitum statute without proof of an accused’s knowledge of it may be harsh when
considered on an individual basis, broader social objectives secured
by the maxim’s application would seem to justify such a result. If one
applies the Holmesian rationale,205 for example, there is little reason
to conclude that Congress desires the citizenry to know less about its
duties under mala prohibita statutes than under mala in se statutes.
To reach this conclusion would essentially relegate mala prohibita
crimes to second-class status and make societal knowledge of such
statutes far less likely than if they were applied harshly in individual
cases. Application of such a statute to an unwitting citizen would at
least serve the utilitarian purpose of educating others about their duties under the law, whereas a failure to mandate compliance with the
statute would lead only to more confusion about the same.
Such an application would also satisfy the Austinian rationale for
the maxim—the avoidance of nettlesome mistake of law claims.206 If
mala prohibita statutes are as obscure as their critics claim, and if
proof of their knowledge were required, every person prosecuted for
their violation would have a winning defense. The facts of Bryan illustrate this well. Had the government been forced to prove Bryan’s
actual awareness of the licensing requirement—a malum prohibitum
requirement—not only would the prosecution of Bryan have failed,
but the vast majority of prosecutions brought under that provision
would have suffered the same fate, for, as Selden put it, “’tis an excuse every man will plead, and no man can tell how to refute him.”207
Proponents of Hall’s rationale208 would no doubt concur with this
result, although for a different reason: any other result would violate
the principle of legality by elevating the accused’s erroneous under205. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing Holmes’s utilitarian argument that the maxim is justified by the societal goal of promoting a national fluency in the law).
206. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing Austin’s argument that the
maxim is justified by the need to avoid the rampant mistake of law claims that would inevitably
be made in its absence).
207. QUOTABLE LAWYER, supra note 1, at 133.
208. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing Hall’s argument that the
maxim is justified by the principle of legality).
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standing of his duties under the law to a position above the law itself.
Again using the malum prohibitum facts of Bryan as an example,
even if one accepts as true that Bryan was ignorant of the federal licensing requirement, the law itself is, in fact, otherwise. Thus, to accept Bryan’s defense of ignorance would permit him to carve out his
own personal code of conduct that he could then use to shield himself
from punishment for his violations of Congress’s contrary decrees.
Congress can, of course, eliminate the harshness that results
from the application of the maxim in individual cases if it wishes to
do so. In our system of governance, however, the ultimate responsibility for drawing the line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior lies with the legislature. Although the courts may not always
like those legislative choices, if the choices are constitutionally sound,
important separation of powers principles are infringed when courts
read into criminal statutes a mental state element that was outside
the contemplation of the legislature.
D. Conclusion
To recap, the courts have invented a number of factors which
they frequently use to construe “willfully” to require proof of knowledge of the law. Although in theory these factors could have provided both coherence to constructions of willfulness and greater predictability to the process of making the criminal law, they have done
the opposite in practice.
There are two possible ways to explain the courts’ continued
movement away from the ignorantia legis doctrine in the face of the
confusion and inconsistency generated by these decisions. First, the
courts may simply be unaware both of the dramatic injury the decisions have collectively inflicted on the maxim and of how incoherent
the bases for those decisions have become over time. To this day, jurists tend to profess devotion to the maxim even as they are carving
out exceptions to it.209 If these statements are taken seriously, the judiciary itself may simply be oblivious to the radical change that the
jurisprudence of willfulness has already wrought and the number of
statutes now in danger of similar construction.210
A second possibility is that with the proliferation of the criminal
law, and in particular the federal criminal law, the courts have be-

209.
210.

See infra note 224.
See infra Appendix, Tables 1 & 2.
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come increasingly hostile to the ignorantia legis maxim. This may explain the courts’ willingness to adopt an interpretive approach that so
clearly hinders legislative prerogatives. Put slightly differently, the
courts’ concerns about “overcriminalization”211 and the federalization
of crime212 may best explain the attack on the maxim.
Criminal law, and in particular federal criminal law, has experienced explosive growth over the last century. Legal writers estimate
that over 300,000 federal regulations are now enforced through the
use of criminal penalties.213 Substantive federal criminal provisions
have also experienced dramatic growth.214 At the same time, Congress
has increased the criminal sentences that may be imposed upon offenders by attaching mandatory minimum provisions215 and “three
strikes” penalties216 to many crimes. Critics of federalization argue
211. A number of excellent books and articles addressing this concern are available. See
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 277-82 (1968); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—And What Can
Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1878-82 (1992); Hart, supra note 4, at 417-22; Sanford
H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157
(1967); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing
Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963).
212. Perhaps the most prestigious public figure to voice this concern is Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. At a meeting of the American Law Institute in May 1998, Chief Justice
Rehnquist questioned the wisdom of legislation that made federal offenses of matters once
prosecuted solely by the states. Apart from federalism concerns raised by such legislation,
Rehnquist warned that the explosion in federal criminal statutes severely burdened the federal
judiciary. See Chief Justice Criticizes Trend Toward Federalization of Crime, 66 U.S.L.W. 2722
(May 26, 1998); see also Sara Sun Beale, Reporter’s Draft for the Working Group on Principles
to Use When Considering the Federalization of Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1277 (1995);
Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 503 (1995); Note,
Mens Rea in Federal Criminal Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2402, 2416 (1998) (arguing that federalism concerns may covertly “animate the Court’s federal mens rea jurisprudence”).
213. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 216 & n.94 (1991).
214. For an overview of the use of criminal penalties to influence business behavior, see
NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
43-45 (2d ed. 1993) (describing “a continuing pattern of expansion” in federal provisions); see
also KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1995) (addressing white collar and business crimes); PAMELA H. BUCY,
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1998) (same).
215. For a comment on the increasing use of mandatory minimums, see William W
Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums: Mixing Apples and Oranges, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 405 (1992).
216. For an article criticizing the recent growth in “three strikes” provisions as “ nonreasoned, knee-jerk approaches to fighting crime,” see Nkechi Taifa, “Three-Strikes-andYou’re-Out”—Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV.
717, 717 (1995).
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that the swell in federal prosecutorial authority to reach beyond areas
of exclusive federal concern is misguided.217 Critics of overcriminalization add the concern that as the criminal law expands to cover an
extensive range of human behavior, prosecutorial resources will be
strained to the limit,218 leading both to underenforcement of the laws
and to the danger of selective prosecution.219 These critics also urge
that when the criminal law begins to intrude into areas individuals do
not expect to be governed, the consent of the governed will be lost
and the power of the criminal sanction diluted.220
Even assuming the validity of these concerns, the Court’s chosen
remedy—fabricating factors that can be used to construe “willfully”
to support a departure from the maxim—can have little effect on the
problem of overcriminalization and the federalization of crime. Because the courts are confined to deciding cases and controversies that
come before them, no systematic assault on these problems is waged
by the “jurisprudence of willfulness.” Moreover, far from representing a united front, the poorly reasoned decisions have created a body
of haphazard constructions of “willfully” as courts have substituted
legislative judgments with their own subjective conceptions of
“complex” and “not complex,” “nefarious” and “non-nefarious” conduct. The difficulty that the courts have already had in defining
“complex” statutes and “non-nefarious” conduct demonstrates how
subjective these conceptions remain. Moreover, statutory complexity
and non-nefariousness are poor proxies for overcriminalization and
unwarranted federalization. For this reason, even when the
“willfulness” decisions narrow the scope of the federal criminal law,
they will not eliminate these problems, if problems they be.
III. CONGRESSIONAL DEVOTION TO THE MAXIM
Despite the venerable pedigree of the ignorantia legis maxim,
the movement away from the doctrine depicted in Part II has met
with surprisingly little reproach. This is surely due in part to the fact
that as the courts have moved away from the maxim, they have care-

217. See supra note 212.
218. See, e.g., Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, supra note 211, at 165-67
(discussing the use of criminal prosecution as a substitute for more appropriate intervention by
other state agencies).
219. See, e.g., id. at 168 (discussing selective enforcement of vagrancy and disorderly conduct laws).
220. See, e.g., id. at 160; PACKER, supra note 211, at 359.
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fully cloaked their decisions in language loyal to the maxim. These
rhetorical devices have created a (mis)impression, in both Congress
and the public, that the maxim continues to preclude the bulk of mistake of law claims.221
This Part argues that contemporary constructions of criminal
“willfulness” are supported by scant evidence of congressional intent
to depart from the maxim. If anything, the swift and disapproving
congressional reaction to the Ratzlaf decision supports the opposite
conclusion. Although recent “willfulness” decisions display a judicial
221. Indeed, many first year law students are specifically instructed that the construction of
willfulness in Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), is aberrational. The authors of one
widely used criminal law casebook state broadly that “[m]ost courts have refused to extend
Cheek to other types of statutes.” JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 294 (3d ed. 1996). Although the authors note Ratzlaf as an important exception,
see id., this passage leaves the erroneous impression that “willfully” is rarely construed to require proof of knowledge of the law. As the cases discussed in Part II of this Article demonstrate, that is incorrect.
The impression is exacerbated by the view of some jurists and criminal law theorists
that decisions that construe a mens rea term to make knowledge of the law an element do not
implicate the maxim at all. See, e.g., LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 66, § 5.1(a), at 575. Under
this view, the decisions need not be considered “exceptions” to the maxim at all; they simply
address the elements the prosecution is expected to establish to secure a conviction. It is, of
course, true as a descriptive matter that knowledge of the law is an element of an offense only
when it is expressly defined as an element of an offense. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3)
(1985) (“When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly
with respect thereto.”). Thus, if knowledge of the law is not an express element of the offense,
knowledge of the law is not required; instead, recklessness with respect to the law’s existence
suffices to establish culpability. This basic point is important to bear in mind, so that when the
legislature expressly makes knowledge of the law an element, the government will have to
prove it. However, this logical truth—that if knowledge is not an element then it need not be
proved—is irrelevant. Whether considered as an exception to the maxim or not the crux of the
accused’s claim is the same—the accused argues that her ignorance of or mistake about the law
takes her out of the statute’s coverage. Consideration of the claims in the three major Supreme
Court decisions on the question during the last decade illustrate the point. In Cheek, 498 U.S. at
196, the defendant’s claim was that he did not understand (i.e., he was ignorant of the fact) that
the tax code required him to declare his wages as income. In Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. 135, 138 (1994),
the defendant’s claim was that he was ignorant of the illegality of structuring his transactions to
evade the bank’s and the casino’s reporting responsibilities. In Bryan, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1944
(1998), the defendant claimed that he was unaware (or at least that the government failed to
prove that he was aware) of the law that required him to possess a license before selling guns.
Of course one can say that the maxim was not violated in each case because the Court construed knowledge to be an element of the offense, but saying this and no more disguises a significant substantive shift: the Court is “discovering” this element in statutes without express (or
tacit) approval from Congress in cases where it used to be presumed that no such element existed. See Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting
“Apparent Innocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 17 & n.72 (1995) (arguing
that these disclaimers are “largely semantic” and arise from the belief that the maxim is
“virtually inviolable”).
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inclination to treat the Ratzlaf legislative history as “idle chatter,”222
this is a dangerous inclination for both normative and process reasons.
A. Legislating Against the Backdrop of the Maxim
If the ignorantia legis maxim has any meaning at all, it is that ignorance of, or a mistake about, the law ordinarily will be of no help
to the accused. While there are surely exceptions to the maxim, it
seems prudent to bear in mind that they are precisely that—
exceptions, not rules. Given the maxim’s widespread familiarity and
acceptance, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress legislates
against a backdrop informed by the maxim. Put slightly differently,
Congress legislates with the expectation that the maxim will guide judicial efforts to discern whether Congress intended in a particular
statute to depart from the general rule or not.
The notion that Congress legislates against the backdrop of existing law—including both statutory and judge-made law—is no novel
proposition. Congress is regularly presumed to be “reasonably attentive to and in agreement with the ‘background of customs and understandings of the way things are done . . . .’”223 Thus, it is reasonable to
presume that when Congress remains silent about the meaning of a
particular statutory term, it has done so with the expectation that the
term will be construed in a fashion consistent with prevailing canons
of statutory interpretation.
1. Judicial Assurances of the Maxim’s Vitality. Repeated
expressions by the Court of its allegiance to the ignorantia legis
maxim throughout this century224 have provided (apparently false)
assurance to Congress that the maxim would guide judicial
constructions of federal criminal provisions. Based on these

222. See generally James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations
of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 61-66 (1994) (defending the
relevance of post-enactment congressional history to statutory construction).
223. Id. at 78-79 (quoting David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 942 (1992)); see also id. at 943 (arguing that “the best reconstruction of what the drafters were trying and not trying to do” is obtained by applying canons of
statutory construction to achieve continuity in the law); cf. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v.
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (stating that Congress should be presumed to legislate with
the understanding that the principle of preclusion will be applied); Johnson v. Home State
Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1991) (stating that Congress is presumed to legislate with awareness
of prior judicial constructions of a particular statutory term).
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assurances, it was reasonable for Congress to proceed on the
assumption that its criminal enactments would not be read to impose
a knowledge of the law requirement unless Congress itself had
expressed an intent to depart from the maxim. Although the tax cases
marked an important departure, without an expression of
congressional intent until after the fact, broad statements by the
Court in the tax and other cases provided Congress with ample
reason to believe that the maxim remained the dominant rule and
that the construction of “willfully” in the tax statutes carved out a
narrow, useful, and clearly delineated exception to it.
The Court’s public reaffirmations of the maxim could have only
bolstered congressional confidence that non-tax offenders would not
be entitled to a mistake of law defense unless Congress had plainly
expressed an intent to furnish such an excuse. With these and other
judicial assurances, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress was
legislating against a backdrop of the ignorantia legis maxim. Except
in tax cases, Congress should have been able to insert the term
“willfully” into a criminal statute with considerable confidence that
the courts would construe the term consistently with the maxim. Effectively, the tax cases created a form of default rule for legislators. If
Congress used “willfully” in a criminal tax statute without defining
the term, the Court’s default rule should have been to assume that
Congress intended knowledge of illegality to be an element. In any
other criminal statute, the opposite should have been true. The default construction should have been that Congress had drafted the
statute against the backdrop of the maxim, and that therefore knowledge of illegality was not intended to be an element.225

224. Even decisions that permitted mistake or ignorance of the law professed an enduring
commitment to the maxim. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 149 (“We do not dishonor the venerable
principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge.”); Cheek, 498
U.S. at 199 (“The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of the law is no defense to
criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system.”).
225. Of course, even in the absence of evidence indicating congressional intent to make
knowledge of the law an element in crimes of willfulness, the rule of lenity could support such a
construction. When faced with an ambiguous term in a criminal statute, the rule of lenity counsels an interpretation in favor of the accused. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 902, 1332 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, if
“willfully” is inherently ambiguous, under the rule of lenity it might fairly be construed to require the accused’s knowledge of the law.
There are at least two serious problems with the application of the rule of lenity to this
situation, however. First, the Supreme Court has strongly suggested that the use of the term
“willfully” does not make a criminal statute ambiguous. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147-48. If the
Court would have this “cake” (finding that the term is so unambiguous that resort to legislative
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2. Guidance from the Model Penal Code. The American Law
Institute’s treatment of the term “willfully” in the drafting of the
Model Penal Code (the Code) in 1955 supports the view that
Congress has long enacted criminal statutes against the backdrop of
the maxim. Indeed, the Code’s study and treatment of the term flatly
contradicts any suggestion that use of the term, by itself, sufficiently
evidences congressional intent to depart from the maxim, and
particularly that it does so with sufficient clarity to make resort to
legislative history unnecessary.
In the first place, the drafters of the Code concluded that the
term “willfully” had far too many different meanings to be used in
the Code’s precise hierarchy of mens rea definitions. In a famous exchange between two of the most eminent and experienced legal
thinkers of the era, Judge Learned Hand and Professor Herbert
Wechsler agreed that the term had been used in so many different
ways that it would be best to dispense with it entirely,226 and the term
was indeed banished from the Code’s definitions. Nonetheless, because of its widespread use, the Code’s draftsmen felt that some definition of the term “willful” ought to be included.227 They settled on a
definition that paralleled the most common meaning that the state
and federal legislators had given the term at the time.228 Accordingly,
history is unnecessary) it cannot then “eat it too” (finding that the term is so ambiguous to support a knowledge of the law construction in favor of the accused). Second, and more importantly, the term will only be ambiguous if the maxim is disregarded prior to efforts to construe
it. If, however, the maxim is used as a starting point in the interpretive process, and thus it is
presumed that the statute in which the term appears does not countenance a mistake of law
claim, in the typical case there would be no call to resort to the rule of lenity. In a less typical
case, the term might be ambiguous, not because the term is ambiguous in and of itself, but because of its special placement in a particular statute, or because of some indication on the face
of the statute or its legislative history that plainly expresses the congressional desire to depart
from the presumptive force of the maxim.
226. A colloquy between Judge Learned Hand and Model Penal Code Chief Reporter
Herbert Wechsler regarding the inclusion of the mens rea term “willful” in the proposed Model
Penal Code provisions epitomizes the opinion of the term held by many jurists and academics:
JUDGE HAND: It’s an awful word! It is one of the most troublesome words in a
statute that I know. If I were to have the index purged, “wilful” would lead all the
rest in spite of its being at the end of the alphabet.
MR. WECHSLER: I agree with you Judge Hand, and I promise you unequivocally
that the word will never be used in the definition of any offense in the Code. But because it is such a dreadful word and so common in the regulatory statutes, it seemed
to me useful to superimpose some norm of meaning on it . . . .
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) cmt. 10 at 249 n.47 (1985) (quoting ALI Proceedings 160
(1955)) (ellipsis in original).
227. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) cmt. 10 (1985).
228. See id. & nn.44-45 (citing cases and statutes).
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section 2.02(8) defined “willfully” to mean “knowingly,” unless there
was a demonstrated legislative purpose that it mean something
more.229 The Code also assumed as a default position that knowledge
of the law defining an offense would not be a requirement for conviction.230 Thus, in the closest thing to a restatement that the criminal
law has known,231 the country’s leading criminal scholars concluded
that the term “willful” had no set meaning and that the most popular
meaning was simply “knowing,” not knowledge of the law.
To be sure, the drafters left open the possibility that a legislature
could use the term “willfully” to mean something more than mere
knowledge, if “a purpose to impose further requirements appears.”232
However, the “something more” the drafters probably had in mind
was the mental state of purpose, not a requirement that the state
prove that the defendant knew the law.233 More importantly, the
Code’s approach both supports and promotes the view that the use of
the term “willful” is not a signal that the maxim is being abandoned—much less an unambiguous signal to that effect.234 Of course,
if the Code were being written today, the drafters’ description of how
state and federal courts had construed “willfully” would be quite different—certainly the Court offered a very different construction in
235
Bryan. Hosts of federal criminal statutes, however, were enacted
against the background that the Code drafters saw at the time they
wrote, and Congress should be understood to have made the same interpretive presumptions as they did. As to more recently drafted
statutes, it seems entirely likely that Congress thought that the

229. See id. at 249 & n.46.
230. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9).
231. Although in many sections the Code was more of a law reform effort than a restatement, it was designed to be a restatement with regard to the definition of “willfully.” See id.
§ 2.02(8) cmt. 10 & nn. 44-47.
232. Id. § 2.02(8).
233. Indeed, the very next subsection of the Code, section 2.02(9), states that ignorance of
the law is not an excuse unless the statute in question so provides. If mere inclusion of the term
“willful” was thought to be enough to require knowledge of the law, the drafters of the Code
certainly would have said so in section 2.02(9).
234. In light of the historical evidence collected by the Code’s drafters that “willfully” had
been used by most jurisdictions to mean “knowingly,” even a textualist who was loathe to consult legislative history should read the term to require far less than proof of knowledge of the
law. Under a textualist perspective, see infra note 255 (discussing this approach), it is proper to
assume that Congress was aware of the prevailing definition of “willfully” portrayed by the
Code’s commentary and that Congress recognized that the only effective way to interject a
knowledge of illegality requirement would be to do so expressly.
235. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Bryan).
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maxim still governed—at least until the Court’s decision in Ratzlaf.
The bulk of the statutes listed in the Appendix, however, were enacted long before 1994, the year Ratzlaf was decided, and thus would
have been enacted against the same backdrop.
B. Congressional Acceptance of the Maxim as a Default Rule
The increasing tendency toward reflexive interpretations of
“willfully” to mandate proof of an accused’s knowledge that the conduct at issue is unlawful236 fails to credit clear evidence that Congress
has accepted the maxim as a default rule. The central issue in all of
the willfulness cases must be whether the legislature intended
“willfully” to make knowledge of the law a part of the prosecution’s
burden of proof. If the legislature did intend this then an accused’s
ignorance of or mistake about the law should lead to an acquittal because the legislature had decided that an act performed in ignorance
or mistake of the law should provide a defense. If the legislature did
not intend this then the accused’s ignorance of or mistake about the
law should not lead to an acquittal because the legislature had not
decreed ignorance or mistake of law to be a defense. The critical
question, then, is what the legislature intended “willfully” to mean
when it included the term in the statute.
1. Ratzlaf Legislative Commentary. Some of the most
compelling evidence that Congress does not intend to create a
mistake of law defense each time it includes the word “willfully” in a
criminal statute comes from the congressional commentary to the
Ratzlaf decision. Congress’s response to the Court’s decision in
Ratzlaf was swift and disapproving. Within months of the decision,
Congress legislatively overrode the Court’s construction by
exempting from the willfulness requirement cases brought under the
federal structuring provision at issue in Ratzlaf.237 In effecting this
change, Congress left no doubt that its action was designed to remedy
the error that it believed the Ratzlaf Court had made when it
236. The majority’s broad statement in Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1945 (1998),
provides the most recent example of this interpretive position. See supra Part II.B.2.
237. See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(4)(A) (1994)); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 103-438, at 22 (1994). The rapid congressional response vindicated Justice
Blackmun, who had written in dissent in Ratzlaf, “[n]ow Congress must try again to fill a hole it
rightly felt it had filled before.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 162 (1994) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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construed “willfully” to require proof of knowledge of the structuring
prohibition. As reflected in both the report of the House Committee
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs238 and the House Conference
Report,239 the amendment was adopted “to correct” the majority’s
holding in Ratzlaf and to “restore[] the clear Congressional intent that
a defendant need only have the intent to evade the reporting
requirement” to commit a structuring offense.240 Contrary to Ratzlaf’s
interpretation of Congress’s intent in using the word “willfully,” the
history of the amendment made clear that Congress had not intended
to require the government to have to prove that a “defendant knew
that structuring was illegal” in order to secure a conviction.241
Once under consideration, the speed with which Congress effected this statutory change underscores its displeasure with the
Court’s interpretation of “willfulness.” Support for the amendment
was apparently overwhelming: a mere five days separated the bill’s
successful passage through the House and the Senate, and the Senate’s approval of the conference report was obtained by voice vote. 242
Despite the clear congressional disapproval of the judicial interpretation of “willfulness” in this post-Ratzlaf amendment, Congress’s
decision to override the Court’s construction has had no effect on
later constructions of “willfulness” in other criminal statutory
schemes. Rather, the courts have continued to treat the Ratzlaf construction of “willfully” as an accurate reading of congressional intent243 and have used the same bases that led to the mistake, and the
mistake itself, to determine what Congress meant in other statutes.
Worse than mere obstinacy, this refusal to recognize the mistake undermines the legislative function and may violate separation of powers principles.
Critics of this view might argue that Ratzlaf was no mistake at
all. By removing only the structuring offense set out in section 5324
238. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-438, at 22 (1994).
239. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-652, at 194 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881,
2024.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. Id.
242. See 140 CONG. REC. H6797 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994) (noting passage in the House with
a vote of 410 to 12); 140 CONG. REC. S11,043 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1994) (noting passage by voice
vote); see also Clinton to Sign New Law After Easy Passage, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT,
Aug. 1994, at 1.
243. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1945 (1998); Hanlester Network v.
Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir.
1995).
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from the willfulness requirement but allowing other related offenses
to remain subject to that requirement, one might argue that Congress
was signaling its agreement with the Court’s construction of
“willfully” and reaffirming its desire to make knowledge of the law
an element of other structuring offenses to which the willfulness requirement of section 5322(a) continued to apply. After all, Congress
could easily have taken the word “willfully” out of the statute altogether. Its decision to retain it while making the word inapplicable to
the particular subsection under which Ratzlaf was prosecuted could
indicate that it concurred with, or at least acquiesced in, the Court’s
interpretation of the term. Under this view, Ratzlaf-like structuring
behavior would no longer be subject to an ignorance or mistake of
law claim, but other structuring conduct falling under the reserved
willfulness requirement would.
The difficulty with this view is that it completely ignores the best
available source of information about Congress’s view of the Ratzlaf
construction of the term “willfully.” The committee reports explain
the impetus for the statutory change in no uncertain terms. As noted
above, the reports roundly criticize the Court’s construction and explain that the statutory change was intended to “correct” the error
made by the Ratzlaf Court when it interpreted the term to impose a
knowledge of the law requirement.244 The reports also clarify the legislative intent behind the initial use of the term in the structuring
provision: prosecutors were expected to prove an accused’s intent to
evade a financial institution’s reporting obligations, but not the accused’s knowledge that structuring was illegal.245
Moreover, even assuming that the structuring provisions which
remain subject to the willfulness requirement after the amendment
could be fairly construed to require proof of knowledge of the law,
the legislative history overruling the Ratzlaf construction of section 5324 at least demonstrates the incorrectness of any claim that
Congress equates “willfully” with knowledge of the law whenever it
places the term in a criminal statute. The term was employed in section 5324, and Congress has denounced the suggestion that it used the
word to make knowledge of the law an element of the offense. It is
sensible to conclude from this congressional commentary that the use
of the term “willfully” in other statutory contexts was not necessarily
244.
2024.
245.

See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-652, at 194 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881,
See id.
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intended to provide a mistake of law defense. Finally, Congress’s
powerful repudiation of the Court’s interpretation of “willfully” in
Ratzlaf was also a repudiation of the Court’s argument that conduct
like Ratzlaf’s evasions was not nefarious or that the crime of structuring was so technical that Congress must have wanted ignorance of
the law to excuse. That repudiation should have led the Court to appreciate the gross subjectivity in such determinations and to hesitate
before making them in the future. If Bryan is any indication, however, the Court is unbowed.
2. The Child Support Recovery Act Provisions. Statutes that do
excuse mistakes of law reveal that Congress knows how to create a
mistake of law defense when it so intends. Courts simply need to look
beyond statutory text to ascertain whether Congress intends a
departure from the maxim. A case brought under the Child Support
Recovery Act (CSRA)246 provides a helpful example. The CSRA
makes it a crime for any person to “willfully fail[] to pay a past due
support obligation” with respect to a child who resides in another
State.247 In United States v. Williams,248 a federal court of appeals
construing the willfulness requirement of the CSRA suggested that
the term should be construed to require proof of the defendant’s
intentional violation of a known legal duty for two reasons. First, like
the tax statutes, the CSRA criminalizes willful failures to pay a
monetary obligation.249 This similarity impressed the court as a basis
for construing the intent requirement of the CSRA provision in the
same way that the intent requirements of the tax provisions had been
read.250 Second, and more importantly, the legislative history of the
provision plainly evidenced Congress’s intent that knowledge of
illegality be required for a conviction. The House Report on the
CSRA specifically referred to the tax provisions and explained the
significance of the case law construing the scienter requirements of
those provisions to the CSRA: “The Committee intends that the

246. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
247. Id. at § 228(a). A “past due support obligation” is separately defined in the statute to
include any child support or maintenance payment ordered pursuant to state law that either has
remained unpaid for over one year or is in excess of $5,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 228(b) (1994).
248. 121 F.3d 615 (11th Cir. 1997).
249. See id. at 620-21.
250. See id. at 621.
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willful failure standard of [the CSRA] be given similar effect as the
willful failure standard contained in these tax felony provisions.”251
This legislative history underscores two points. First, when Congress wishes to create a mistake of law defense, it knows how to say
so explicitly.252 Second, it is important for a court to plumb the legislative history of a statute that contains the term “willfully” to discover
evidence of whether this was Congress’s intent or not. In the case described above, the House Report illuminated the congressional intent
to make knowledge of the law an element of the CSRA. Without the
benefit of the report, the court might have concluded that such was
Congress’s intent, but the conclusion would have been no better than
a lucky guess.253 Only by examining the legislative history could the
court have been confident in its assessment of the legislature’s design
in employing the term.254

251. See id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 102-771, at 6 (1992) (alteration in original)).
252. Section 922(b)(3) of the federal firearms provisions provides another example. See
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, 451 (1986) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 922(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)) (providing that dealers would be “presumed” to
know the state laws and ordinances governing their trade “in the absence of evidence to the
contrary”).
253. Although the court offered an alternative basis for its conclusion—the parallel duties
imposed by the tax provisions and the CSRA provisions, see supra text accompanying notes
249-50—that second basis alone would have provided insufficient basis for the case holding.
The justification for requiring proof of knowledge of the law in tax prosecutions is not that the
tax code imposes a duty to meet some monetary obligation owed to the government; rather, it
derives from the sheer volume and complexity of the tax provisions which obscure our tax duties and liabilities. The same cannot seriously be said of a duty to pay child support.
254. By ignoring the legislative history of the anti-structuring statute, the Ratzlaf Court
guessed wrong. See supra Part III.B.1. To avoid repeating this kind of error in construction it is
incumbent upon the courts to search for evidence of congressional intent. A helpful illustration
is provided by the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986, 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-58 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Section 54 of that law sets forth criminal penalties for any person who has “knowingly and willfully
engage[d]” in certain kickback activity specified by another section the Act. The section fails to
define the “knowingly and willfully” phrase, although the Act does define a number of its other
critical terms. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 52(1)-(9) (defining “contracting agency,” “kickback,”
“person,” “prime contract,” “prime contractor,” “prime contractor employee,” “subcontract,”
“subcontractor” and “subcontractor employee”). Courts attempting to determine the meaning
of the Act’s “willfulness” requirement can find guidance in the statute’s legislative history.
Statements by Senator Levin when introducing the bill on the Senate floor just before its passage are particularly helpful in illuminating the congressional intent underlying the phrase. As
Senator Levin explained:
The bill provides that, to be subject to criminal penalties, the wrongdoer must act
“knowingly and willfully.” The current Anti-Kickback act imposes its criminal penalties on those who act “knowingly.” The addition in the bill of the word “willfully” is
not, however, a change in current law but a reflection of the actual standard being
used in kickback cases.
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C. Costs of Ignoring Plain Congressional Commentary
Some might argue that the confusion emanating from the jurisprudence of willfulness is due more to legislative neglect than to judicial overreaching. Under this reasoning, if the courts have in fact misconstrued the mens rea term, they have done so as a result of
Congress’s failure to communicate effectively the line between lawful
and unlawful (willful) conduct. To clear up the confusion, Congress
could simply add the words “errors of law are no excuse” to every
criminal statute with a mens rea of “willfully.”
This Subpart argues, however, that federal courts undermine
congressional rulemaking authority when they refuse to consult
sources that would inform their constructions of criminal willfulness.255 Each such refusal exacts significant “opportunity costs.”256 For
example, Congress’s lawmaking powers are diminished each time a
court construes a federal statute in contravention of congressional intent. Although Congress may always correct an erroneous construction of an enacted law, doing so requires the commitment of finite
time and resources. As one legislative scholar put it, “systematic judi-

The knowing element in the standard requires the Government to prove that the alleged wrongdoer knew what he or she was doing and was not acting through mistake,
inadvertence or mere negligence. The willful element in the standard requires the
Government to prove that the alleged wrongdoer was acting on his or her own volition
and not because he or she was being coerced. . . .
The knowing and willful standard does not require proof of a specific criminal intent
such as an intent to defraud the Government. All that is required for criminal liability is proof that the alleged wrongdoer knew what he or she was doing and was acting
on his or her own volition.
132 Cong. Rec. S16,307-01 (comments of Senator Levin) (emphasis added). This statement
clearly indicates that Congress did not intend “willfully” in the context of this statute to require
proof of an accused’s knowledge of the law.
255. I am aware, of course, that textualists would argue that looking beyond the statutory
text is inappropriate. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 621, 650-56 (1990) (detailing Justice Scalia’s textualist approach). The nation’s leading
textualist, Justice Scalia, is likely to balk, therefore, at the suggestion that the courts consult
legislative history to determine the meaning of “willfully.” See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION 29-30 (1997). Even those who favor a textualist approach, however,
should find fault with the current trend to interpret statutes containing language of willfulness
to require proof of knowledge of the law. In recognition of the fact that text is sometimes inconclusive, textualists frequently consult dictionaries to ascertain the meaning of statutory text.
See David O. Stewart, By the Book: Looking up the Law in the Dictionary, A.B.A. J., July 1993,
at 46 (reporting a rise in the number of times the Supreme Court has consulted dictionaries to
define textual meaning); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438-39 (1994) (same). No dictionary defines “willfully” to mean an action done with knowledge of the law.
256. See infra notes 257 & 265-66 and accompanying text.
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cial rejection or discounting of legislative signals . . . imposes significant costs on Congress,” including a diminution of congressional productivity and dilution of congressional influence.257 The statutes collected in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix give some measure of the cost
that would be exacted by such an interpretive policy. The word
“willfully” appears in each of the 160 provisions cited in the Tables,
either in conjunction with another mens rea term258 or in conjunction
with the term “violates” or “violating.”259 Moreover, “willfully” appears, not linked to another mens rea term or “violates” or
“violating,” in a great number of other criminal provisions.260 Again, a
better interpretive approach would be to accept the message the congressional commentary to Ratzlaf so plainly reveals: the Court’s
reading of “willfully” was in error, and when Congress employs the
term in criminal statutes, it does so against the backdrop of the igno261
rantia legis maxim.
While it is true that Congress at times chooses to leave its intent
unclear, perhaps in an effort to achieve consensus on a controversial
bill,262 or at other times neglects to make its intent clear, perhaps because it is unable to anticipate all of the situations that may be governed by a statute,263 these arguments are not pertinent here. There is
no reason to believe that Congress’s use of “willfully” has been
driven by the need to obtain political consensus. The early default
rule created by the Court (reading a knowledge of the law requirement into the term only in the tax context) refutes any suggestion
that Congress has employed the term for that purpose. The postRatzlaf amendment underscores this point. Neither is there reason to
conclude that Congress uses “willfully” because of its inability to
predict the myriad scenarios in which a criminal provision might be

257. Brudney, supra note 222, at 69.
258. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
259. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
260. A broader computer search of Westlaw’s United States Code database, using only the
term “willfully,” was intercepted because of the large number of documents that would have
been retrieved. The broad statement in Bryan suggests that this category of statutes is also at
risk of being found to require proof of knowledge of the law. See supra Part II.B.2.
261. See supra Part III.B.1.
262. See Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 187 (1986);
Brudney, supra note 222, at 10.
263. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1 (1990) (opening statement of Chairman Kastenmeier); id. at 88
(statement of Prof. William Eskridge, Jr.); Brudney, supra note 222, at 10.
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put to use. The relevance of an individual’s lack of knowledge or understanding of the law to prosecution is relatively simple to anticipate. The legislative history of the CSRA underscores this point.
Therefore, a gap in legislative thinking is unlikely and there is no
need for the Court to develop the law on the basis of the facts of particular cases.264
Given the prominence of “willfully” throughout the federal
criminal code, the cost of a policy requiring Congress to clarify the
intent underlying “willfully” in each of these statutes would be staggering:265 it would negatively affect Congress’s ability to control its
legislative calendar, it would reduce Congress’s ability to generate
needed legislation, and it would dilute the effectiveness of the statutes that Congress managed to enact.266
D. Toward a Workable Construction of Criminal Willfulness
The question of whether a particular crime imposes a mens rea
requirement, and if so what scienter is required, is foremost a question of statutory interpretation. The courts’ proper task is to locate
evidence of what Congress intended when it passed a statute and,
subject to certain constitutional limitations, to apply that intent to the
facts of particular cases. In this Subpart I propose a framework that
would restructure, or more precisely, retrench the courts’ current in264. The meaning of the word “willfully” thus provides a sharp contrast with terms such as
“pattern” or “fraud”—terms for which courts must develop meanings over time. See, e.g., H.J.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236-43 (1989) (attempting to develop a
meaningful definition of the term “pattern” within the RICO statutory framework and stating
that “[t]he development of these concepts [that define the term ‘pattern’] must await future
cases” because they “cannot be fixed in advance with [sufficient] clarity”); McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 358-60 (1987) (recognizing ambiguity in the meaning of the word “fraud”
in the mail fraud statute and determining the word’s meaning through an examination of previous judicial decisions). Those terms call out for case-by-case development because legislative
anticipation of how “these rules will operate in the real world” is not entirely possible. Dan M.
Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 5, 12-13
(1997). But see 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994) (redefining “fraud” in the mail fraud statute after seeing how the Supreme Court defined “fraud” in McNally); United States v. Stewart, 872 F.2d
957, 960 (1989) (recognizing legislative rejection of the Supreme Court’s definition of “fraud”
in McNally). By contrast, legislators consider the operation of the term “willfully” with respect
to knowledge of the law to be readily foreseeable.
265. Professor Brudney argues that refusals to credit post-enactment legislative history diminish Congress’s “institutional capability.” Brudney, supra note 222, at 20. Each time Congress is required to clarify the meaning of statutory language, it expends time and resources in
the effort. This reduces its ability to devote that time and those resources to other bills and
matters of congressional concern.
266. See id. at 20-40.
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terpretive approach to determining whether “willfully” in a criminal
statute evidences congressional intent to abide by or depart from the
maxim.
As a starting point, although courts must ever be mindful of Justice Frankfurter’s three rules of statutory interpretation—“(1) [r]ead
the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the statute”267—they must
also recognize that statutory text alone will rarely state explicitly that
knowledge of the law is an element. Neither will the mere inclusion
in a statute of a term with as checkered a past (and present) as
“willfully” reveal that term’s intended meaning. Courts sincerely interested in uncovering this intent must dig deeper to discover it.268 For
the reasons given above, this search should include careful analysis of
the legislative history of the statute at issue.
Second, when scrutinizing the variety of sources that might exhibit congressional intent, the ignorantia legis maxim itself should
take center stage. In the absence of some proof that Congress intended to depart from the maxim by making knowledge of the law an
element of an offense, it should be presumed to have done the opposite. This presumption would be rebuttable by a clear expression of
congressional intent—on the face of the statute itself269 or in the legislative history270—to make knowledge of the law an element. Put
slightly differently, if judicial review of a statute and the legislative
history of that statute fails to reveal the intended meaning of a particular word, Congress should be presumed to have legislated against
the backdrop of the maxim consistent with the courts’ continued assurances that it was free to do so.271 In such a case, the term
“willfully” could not properly be read to require proof of knowledge
of the law.
267. Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in FELIX
FRANKFURTER THE JUDGE 30, 36 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964).
268. Despite the arguments of textualists, see supra note 255, “[t]here has been no serious
effort to limit . . . reliance” on legislative history. Brudney, supra note 222, at 40 n.161; see also
id. at 42 n.172 (describing briefly three reasons courts use legislative history). Neither do textualists command a majority of the Justices on the Court. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 140,
at 78 (“Only Justice Thomas shares Justice Scalia’s zeal for text, the whole text, and nothing
but the text.”).
269. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., supra Part III.B.2 (describing the legislative history of CSRA provisions indicating congressional intent to make knowledge of the law an element).
271. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (“The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in
the American legal system.”); accord Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 n.3 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994).
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This is no radical proposal. Thirty years ago the proposal would
have seemed closer to restatement than reform. In that era, the Court
followed this very practice in rejecting a mistake of law claim in a
prosecution for the “knowing violation” of a federal regulation.272 The
fact that the statute in that case required proof of a “knowing violation” of the statute, rather than a willful one273 compels no contrary
result. As the mercurial history of the word “willfully” demonstrates,
the term has no inherent maxim-devouring properties. It is only
through the process of judicial interpretation that it has come recently, and without compelling justification, to signify a quasi-blanket
exception to the maxim. As demonstrated above,274 such interpretations of the term are suspect because they frequently ignore contrary
indicia of legislative intent.
Third, tax cases constitute an important categorical exception to
the foregoing principles. In prosecutions brought under the tax code
it is appropriate to presume that knowledge of illegality is an element. The longstanding congressional acquiescence in the judiciary’s
construction of “willfully” in this context, as well as congressional
statements affirming the construction in other contexts,275 provides
sufficient evidence of a legislative intent to create an exception to the
maxim in tax crimes.
With the use of this tripartite structure, courts weighing the
availability of mistake of law claims will avoid many of the pitfalls of
the current jurisprudence of willfulness. A return to the maxim will
reduce the confusion evident in modern constructions of willfulness

272. See United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971). The case involved a charge that International Minerals had “knowingly violated” a federal regulation that
prohibited shipments of acid without proper documentation. The issue was whether that required the government to prove the company’s knowledge of illegality (i.e., that it had known it
was violating the regulation). Despite the fact that congressional statements about the mens rea
requirement were inconclusive, the majority held that the maxim was so fundamental to the
criminal law that it outweighed the ambiguity present in the statute’s congressional history. See
id. at 563 (“We conclude that the meager legislative history of the 1960 amendments makes
unwarranted the conclusion that Congress abandoned the general rule and required knowledge
of both the facts and the pertinent law before a criminal conviction could be sustained . . . .”).
273. See 18 U.S.C. § 834(f) (1976) (repealed 1979) (specifying criminal penalties for whoever “knowingly violates” regulations governing the shipment of corrosive liquids).
274. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the Congressional response to Ratzlaf).
275. See supra Part II.B.2 (demonstrating that “willfully” in the CSRA provisions was to be
given the same construction as “willfully” in the tax provisions).
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while respecting legislative primacy and the maxim’s primary rationales.276
Although respect for legislative primacy is, by itself, a sufficient
reason for the general return to the maxim suggested here, it is not
the only reason. As demonstrated in Part II, the gradual abandonment of the maxim has not led to the development of any rational or
consistently applicable rule of decision. In its journey from the
maxim to a new method of deciding ignorance of the law issues, the
Court has stumbled from complexity, to worries about nefariousness,
to “willful”-means-at-least-knowledge-of-general-illegality, as methods for deciding whether a statute requires proof of knowledge of the
law. None of these approaches is workable. The Court’s troubled
path has left the lower courts with little useful guidance for how to
decide such questions in the future and has made it difficult for Congress to predict how statutes will be interpreted. A general return to
the maxim is one way, and perhaps the only sensible way, out of this
thicket.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have documented the erosive forces that have
transformed the principle ignorantia legis non excusat from a fundamental principle of the criminal law into, in many cases, a consideration that is either invoked but honored only in the breach or a “rule”
that attracts no mention at all.277 Contrary to the widely held view
that the principle remains a fundamental cornerstone of criminal jurisprudence, over the last decade, courts have repeatedly construed
the mens rea term “willfully” to make knowledge of the law a prerequisite to criminal liability. These decisions promise to affect dozens of other criminal statutes utilizing the troublesome scienter term.
Contrary to the suggestion found in many of the contemporary
willfulness decisions, there is paltry support for the view that the use

276. Although few would argue that the law today is “definite and knowable,” is also hard
to deny that a policy allowing unlimited availability of the defense to all those accused of
criminal wrongdoing would champion ignorance and undercut the goal to make all “know and
obey.” HOLMES, supra note 4, at 48. Even if most citizens take some pride in being knowledgeable about the law, when an accused’s self-interest is plainly on the side of ignorance (say, to
avoid jail), it seems fair to predict that “pride . . . goeth before the fall.” Proverbs 16:18 (King
James).
277. Many of the willfulness decisions neglect even to mention the maxim. See, e.g., United
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933). Others mention it in passing while denying its relevance to the decision. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994).
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of “willfully” in a criminal statute reflects a legislative design to insert
a knowledge of the law element. Indeed, a much more defensible interpretive approach would presume the opposite. In the normal case,
a reviewing court should presume that Congress inserts the word
“willfully” into a criminal statute against the backdrop of the maxim.
This would mean that ignorance or mistake of law would not excuse,
unless Congress manifested a contrary intent either on the face of the
statute or in its history. Until late in this century, the Supreme Court
essentially followed this approach by repeatedly reaffirming the
maxim in all but tax prosecutions.278 Today, rather than using the
maxim as a starting point for statutory analysis, courts are apt to do
the opposite. The decisions begin with the quasi-presumption that
Congress intended “willfully” to make knowledge of the law an element to be proved by the prosecution. This presumption squarely
undercuts the maxim and violates sound principles of statutory construction.
While critics of overcriminalization are surely justified in fearing
that the force of the criminal sanction may be diluted if it loses the
support of the criminal law’s “most important constituents—the habitually law-abiding,”279 the current constructional approach to criminal willfulness will not provide the solution these critics seek. To
date, the jurisprudence of willfulness has generated wide uncertainty
about the law’s commands. It is now harder than ever to know
whether knowledge of the law will or will not be an element, and if it
will, precisely what the prosecutor’s burden as to that element will
be.280
At the very least, any trend undercutting the venerable maxim
warrants consistent and compelling justification. To date, this has
been lacking. Moreover, principles of legislative primacy, statutory
interpretation, and judicial restraint all push toward the conclusion
that the maxim continues to deserve the support that it has received
for centuries across a huge range of legal systems in the absence of
clearer legislative signals in favor of its abandonment.

278. Even in Ratzlaf the Court emphasized that its construction of willfulness did not offend
the ignorantia legis maxim, reasoning that Congress had indicated its intent to make an exception to the maxim by employing the willfulness term. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 149.
279. PACKER, supra note 211, at 69.
280. That is, whether the government will have to establish the accused’s knowledge of the
specific prohibition violated or the accused’s knowledge of general illegality. See Bryan v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1945-47 (1998).
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1: FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES EMPLOYING THE MENS
REA TERMS “KNOWINGLY” AND “WILLFULLY”
STATUTE CITATION

SCIENTER LANGUAGE EMPLOYED

7 U.S.C. § 2028(d) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully embezzles, steals or obtains by
fraudulent means any funds financed under the Puerto
Rico block grant

8 U.S.C. § 1160(b)(7)(A)(i) (1994 &
Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully falsifies or covers up material
facts in an application for adjustment of alien resident
status

8 U.S.C. § 1253(b) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

willfully fails to comply with regulations or knowingly
gives false information under alien supervision statute

14 U.S.C. § 88(c) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully communicates a false distress
message to the Coast Guard

15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1994)

willfully and knowingly gives false information or fails
to comply with any requirement under the Consumer
Credit Cost Disclosure subchapter

15 U.S.C. § 1681q (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully obtains information on a consumer from a consumer reporting agency under false
pretenses

15 U.S.C. § 1681r (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

employee of a consumer reporting agency who knowingly and willfully provides unauthorized information
concerning an individual from the agency’s files

15 U.S.C. § 1693n(a) (1994)

knowingly and willfully gives false information or fails
to comply with the requirements of the Electronic Fund
Transfers subchapter

18 U.S.C. § 288 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully makes a false claim for a postal
loss

18 U.S.C. § 289 (1994)

knowingly and willfully makes false claims for pensions
within the jurisdiction of the Department of Veterans
Affairs
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18 U.S.C. § 550 (1994)

knowingly and willfully files a false claim for refund of
duties on the exportation of merchandise

18 U.S.C. § 665(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

knowingly enrolls an ineligible participant or willfully
misapplies funds under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act

18 U.S.C. § 660 (1994)

officer or manager of common carrier who knowingly
and willfully converts funds arising from interstate
commerce to personal benefit

18 U.S.C. § 669(a) (Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully embezzles or steals from a
health care benefit program

18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1998)

knowingly and willfully discloses classified information
of the United States to an unauthorized person

18 U.S.C. § 878(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully threatens a foreign official, official guest or internationally protected person

18 U.S.C. § 879(a) (1994)

knowingly and willfully threatens to kill, kidnap, or inflict bodily harm against the President and his family or
a former President and his family

18 U.S.C. § 954 (1994)

willfully and knowingly makes any untrue statement to
influence a foreign government to the injury of the
United States

18 U.S.C. § 957 (1994)

knowingly and willfully possesses any property designed
or intended for use in aid of foreign government in violating the laws of the United States

18 U.S.C. § 1035(a) (Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully makes false statements in any
matter involving a health care benefit program

18 U.S.C. § 1115 (1994)

employee on a sea vessel who knowingly and willfully
causes or allows to be caused through his misconduct or
negligence the death of any person

18 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994)

knowingly, willfully, and corruptly counterfeits the Indian Arts and Crafts Board trademark

18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1994)

willfully and knowingly, without lawful authority, goes
upon Indian land for the purpose of hunting, fishing, or
trapping

DAVIES APPENDIX AFTER HEADER FIX TO PRINTER

416

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

03/13/99 9:58 PM

[Vol. 48:341

18 U.S.C. § 1347 (Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully executes or attempts to execute
a scheme to defraud any health care benefit program

18 U.S.C. § 1366(a)-(b) (1994)

knowingly and willfully damages or attempts to damage
the property of an energy facility

18 U.S.C. § 1501 (1994)

knowingly and willfully obstructs, resists, or opposes a
process server

18 U.S.C. § 1502 (1994)

knowingly and willfully obstructs, resists, or opposes an
extradition agent of the United States in the execution
of his duties

18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully records or attempts to record, or
listens to or observes, or attempts to listen to or observe
the proceedings of a grand or petit jury

18 U.S.C. § 1541 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully grants any passport to or for any
person not owing allegiance to the United States

18 U.S.C. § 1542 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

willfully and knowingly makes any false statement in an
application for a passport

18 U.S.C. § 1543 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use a forged passport

18 U.S.C. § 1544 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

willfully and knowingly misuses a passport

18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully subjects another to involuntary
servitude

18 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994)

knowingly and willfully obstructs the passage of mail

18 U.S.C. § 1721 (1994)

being a Postal Service employee, knowingly and willfully sells or uses stamps for personal benefit

18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1), (3), (4) (1994)

willfully and knowingly enter or obstruct the temporary
offices and residences of the President and any other
person protected by the Secret Service

18 U.S.C. § 1920 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

knowingly and willfully make a false statement or fraud
to obtain Federal employee’s compensation
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18 U.S.C. § 1922 (1994)

willfully fails to make any reports, or knowingly files a
false report concerning Federal employees’ compensation

18 U.S.C. § 2424(a) (1994 & Supp. II
1996)

knowingly and willfully states falsely or fails to disclose
in such statement facts about an alien individual

19 U.S.C. § 1629(f)(2) (1994)

knowingly and willfully falsifies or conceals a material
fact before a foreign customs official stationed in the
United States

19 U.S.C. § 2349 (1994)

knowingly fails to disclose a material fact, or willfully
overvalues any security in seeking relief from injury
caused by import competition

20 U.S.C. § 1097 (1994)

knowingly and willfully embezzles, steals, misapplies, or
obtains by fraud assets insured under the Student Assistance subchapter

22 U.S.C. § 2197(n) (1994)

knowingly makes any false statement, or willfully overvalues any land, property, or security for the purpose of
influencing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation

26 U.S.C. § 7208(4)(B) (1994)

knowingly or willfully traffics any stamp after it has already been used

30 U.S.C. § 1463(a) (1994)

willfully and knowingly commit any act prohibited by
section 1461 of the Mineral Lands and Mining title

33 U.S.C. § 931(a)(1), (c) (1994)

knowingly and willfully making a false statement or representation for the purpose of obtaining or reducing a
benefit under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Chapter

33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (1994)

knowingly and willfully publishes, divulges, or discloses
any confidential information

40 U.S.C. § 212a-2(d) (1994)

knowingly and willfully obstructing, resisting, or interfering with a member of the Capital Police engaged in
the performance of their protective functions

41 U.S.C. § 54 (1994)

knowingly and willfully engaging in conduct prohibited
by section 53 of the Public Contracts title
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42 U.S.C. § 300e-17(h) (1994)

knowingly and willfully making or causing to made any
misrepresentation concerning financial disclosures

42 U.S.C. § 300w-8(1) (1994)

knowingly and willfully making or causing to be made
any false statement or representation of a material fact
in connection with the Preventative Health and Health
Services Block Grants

42 U.S.C. § 707(a)(1) (1994)

knowingly and willfully making false statements or representations under the Maternal and Child Health
Services Block Grant subchapter

42 U.S.C. § 1761(o)(1) (1994 & Supp.
1998)

knowingly and willfully falsifies or conceals a material
fact or makes a false statement in connection with
School Lunch Programs

42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (1994)

knowingly or willfully gives false information or conceals a material fact in connection with voting

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10 (1994)

knowingly and willfully interfering with a person’s right
to vote

42 U.S.C. § 3544(c)(3)(A) (1994)

knowingly and willfully requesting information or disclosing information about a participant in housing and
urban development programs

42 U.S.C. § 5420 (1994)

knowingly and willfully fails to report a violation of any
construction or safety standard

42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (1994 &
Supp. 1998)

knowingly and willfully discloses any information entitled to protection relating to inspections under the Hazardous Waste Management subchapter

42 U.S.C. § 6927(b)(2) (1994)

knowingly and willfully discloses any information entitled to protection relating to inspections under the Hazardous Waste Management subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 6991d(b)(2) (1994)

knowingly and willfully disclosing any information entitled to protection concerning records obtained in connection with the regulation of underground storage
tanks

42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(7)(B) (1994)

knowingly and willfully discloses information entitled to
protection concerning the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability chapter
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47 U.S.C. § 501 (1994)

willfully and knowingly does or causes to be done any
thing prohibited, or fails to do any act required to be
done under the Wire or Radio Communication chapter

49 U.S.C. § 522 (1994)

knowingly and willfully makes a false report or record
to the Secretary of Transportation

49 U.S.C. § 11903 (Supp. I 1995)

knowingly and willfully makes false entries or by other
means falsifies the record required under the Transportation title

49 U.S.C. § 16102 (Supp. I 1995)

knowingly and willfully makes false entries or by other
means falsifies the record required under chapter 157 of
the Transportation title

49 U.S.C. § 30307(b) (1994)

knowingly and willfully requesting, or obtaining information under false pretenses

49 U.S.C. § 46311(a) (1994)

knowingly and willfully disclosing information in violation of the subtitle on Aviation Programs

49 U.S.C. § 46314 (1994)

knowingly and willfully entering aircraft or airport in
violation of security requirements

49 U.S.C. § 46315(b)(1) (1994)

knowingly and willfully operates an aircraft in violation
of requirements of the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration related to the display of lights

49 U.S.C. § 60123(b)-(d) (1994 & Supp.
1998)

knowingly and willfully damaging or destroying a facility or sign, or not heeding location information markings concerning pipelines

50 U.S.C. § 210 (1994)

willfully and knowingly engaging in unauthorized trading
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TABLE 2: FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES EMPLOYING THE MENS
REA TERMS “WILLFULLY VIOLATES”
STATUTE CITATION

SCIENTER LANGUAGE EMPLOYED

2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A) (1994)

knowingly and willfully violating any provision of the
Disclosure of Federal Campaign Funds Act

7 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1994)

willfully and knowingly violate prohibition against insider trading

7 U.S.C. § 3806(a) (1994)

willfully violating any provision of the Swine Health Protection Act

7 U.S.C. § 4810(c) (1994)

willfully violating subsection (a)(1) or (b) of Pork Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act

7 U.S.C. § 6304(q)(4) (1994)

willfully violating the Soybean Promotion, Research,
and Consumer Information Act

7 U.S.C. § 7104(m)(3)(E) (1994)

willfully violating the confidentiality requirement set
forth in the Sheep Promotion, Research, and Information Act

7 U.S.C. § 7414(i)(4)(D) (1994 & Supp. II
1996)

willfully violating the recording requirements of for activities regarding agricultural commodities

7 U.S.C. § 7465(g)(3) (1994 & Supp. II)

willfully violating the confidentiality requirement set
forth in the Kiwifruit subchapter

10 U.S.C. § 2507(c) (1994)

willfully performs any prohibited act or willfully fails to
perform any required act required by data collection
authority of the President to enforce the administration
of the National Defense Technology and Industrial
Base, Defense Act

10 U.S.C. § 2674(c)(3) (1994)

willfully violates any rule or regulation established by
the Secretary of Defense to ensure the safe operation of
the Pentagon Reservation
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12 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994)

willfully violates any regulation under the Financial Recordkeeping chapter

12 U.S.C. § 1957 (1994)

willfully violates or willfully causes a violation of any
regulation under the Financial Recordkeeping chapter in
furtherance of the commission of any violation of Federal law punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year

12 U.S.C. § 2277a-14(a)(3) (1994)

willfully violates prohibitions on the use of the corporate
name, “Farm Credit System Insurance corporation”

15 U.S.C. § 68h (1994)

willfully violates sections 68a, 68c, 68f or 68g(b) of the
Commerce and Trade Act

15 U.S.C. § 69I(a) (1994)

willfully violates sections 69a, 69d, or 69h(b) of the
Commerce and Trade Act

15 U.S.C. § 77x (1994)

willfully violates the rules or regulations promulgated by
the Commerce Commission, or willfully makes false
statements in a registration statement

15 U.S.C. § 77yyy (1994)

willfully violates any provision or rule under the Trust
Indentures subchapter

15 U.S.C.
(1994)

78dd-2(g)(2)(A)-(2)(B)

willfully violates requirements of prohibited foreign
trade practices by domestic concerns

15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a), (c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B)
(1994)

willfully violates any rule or regulation under the Securities Exchanges chapter

15 U.S.C. § 79z-3 (1994)

willfully violates any provision under the Public Utility
Holding Companies chapter

15 U.S.C. § 80a-48 (1994)

willfully violates any provision of the Investment Companies subchapter

15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1994)

willfully violates any provision of the subchapter on Investment Advisers

15 U.S.C. § 330d (1994)

knowingly and willfully violates section 330a of the
Commerce and Trade title

§
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15 U.S.C. § 797(b)(3) (1994)

knowingly and willfully violates after having been subjected to a civil penalty for a prior violation of the same
provision

15 U.S.C. § 1196 (1994)

willfully violates section 1192 or 1197(b) of the Commerce and Trade title

15 U.S.C. § 1717 (1994)

willfully violates any provisions of the Interstate Land
Sales chapter

15 U.S.C. § 2070(a) (1994)

knowingly and willfully violates section 2068 of the
Commerce and Trade title after having received notice
of noncompliance

15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1994)

knowingly or willfully violates any provision of section
2614 or 2689 of the Commerce and Trade title

15 U.S.C. § 3414(c)(1) (1994)

knowingly and willfully violates any provision, except in
paragraph (3) violations, of the Natural Gas Policy chapter

16 U.S.C. § 9a (1994)

knowingly and willfully violates any regulation prescribed by the Secretary of the Army to maintain the national military parks and miscellaneous memorials

16 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(1), (a)(6) (1994)

willfully removes or attempts to remove a wild horse
from public lands without permission, or willfully violates a regulation issued pursuant to the Wild Horses
and Burros chapter

16 U.S.C. § 1417(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. II
1996)

knowingly and willfully violates provision against assaulting, resisting, or interfering with any authorized officer in the conduct of any search of a vessel boarded by
the authorized officer

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) (1994 & Supp.
II 1996)

willfully violates any provision of the Firearms chapter,
other than those already enumerated

18 U.S.C. § 1735 (1994)

willfully violates any regulations of the Board of Governors of the Postal Service prohibiting use of the mails for
any sexually oriented advertisements

DAVIES APPENDIX AFTER HEADER FIX TO PRINTER

1998]

APPENDIX

03/13/99 9:58 PM

423

22 U.S.C. § 287c(b) (1994)

willfully violates or evades or attempts to violate any
rule or regulation issued by the President pursuant to
being called upon by United Nations Security Council

22 U.S.C. § 618(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)

willfully violates any provision of the Registration of
Foreign Propagandists subchapter

22 U.S.C. § 1631n (1994)

willfully violate or knowingly participate in violation of
settlement of international claims

22 U.S.C. § 2712(f)(1) (1994)

willfully violates any regulation under the authority to
control certain terrorism-related services section

22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1994 & Supp. II
1996)

willfully violates any provision of the control of arms exports and imports section

22 U.S.C. § 2780(j) (1994 & Supp. II
1996)

willfully violates any provision of the section concerning
transactions with countries supporting acts of international terrorism

22 U.S.C. § 3105(c) (1994)

willfully fails to submit required information or violates
any rule or regulation of the International Investment
and Trade in Services Survey chapter

25 U.S.C. § 500m (1994)

willfully violates any of the rules issued by the Secretary
of the Interior to regulate the grazing of reindeer

26 U.S.C. § 5605 (1994)

willfully violates regulation relating to the return of materials used in the manufacture of distilled spirits, or
from which distilled spirits may be recovered

26 U.S.C. § 9012(a)(2) (1994)

a political candidate, an authorized national political
committee, or any officer of such committee who knowingly and willfully consents to violation of set spending
limits for presidential campaigns

29 U.S.C. § 186(d)(2) (1994 & Supp.
1998)

willfully violates the section on restrictions on financial
transactions between employers and employees

29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998)

willfully violates any provisions of section 215 of the Labor title
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29 U.S.C. § 439(a) (1994)

willfully violates the subchapter on Reporting by Labor
Organizations, Officers and Employees of Labor Organizations, and Employers

29 U.S.C. § 461(c) (1994)

willfully violates the filing and contents requirements of
a labor organization that has trusteeship over any subordinate labor organization

29 U.S.C. § 463(b) (1994)

willfully violates section concerning unlawful acts relating to labor organization under trusteeship

29 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1994)

willfully violates section on the bonding of officers and
employees of labor organizations

29 U.S.C. § 503(c) (1994)

willfully violates the section prohibiting labor organizations from making loans to any officer or employee of
such organization which results in a total indebtedness in
excess of $2,000

29 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1994)

willfully violates section prohibiting any person convicted of certain felonies or a past or present member of
the Communist Party from serving in a leadership role in
a labor organization

29 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994)

willfully violates section prohibiting a person form extortionate picketing

29 U.S.C. § 530 (1994)

willfully violates section prohibiting the deprivation of
rights by violence of any member of a labor organization

29 U.S.C. § 666(a), (e) (1994)

willfully violates any regulation of the Occupational
Safety and Health chapter

29 U.S.C. §1131 (1994)

willfully violates any provision of part 1 of the Regulatory Provisions subtitle within the subchapter concerning
Employee Benefit Rights Protection

29 U.S.C. §1141 (1994)

willfully violates section prohibiting a person from engaging in coercive interference with a beneficiary of welfare

30 U.S.C. § 820(d) (1994)

willfully violates a mandatory health or safety standard
in operation of a mine
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31 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)

knowingly and willfully violates section 1341(a) or 1342
of the Money and Finance title

31 U.S.C. § 1519 (1994)

knowingly and willfully violating section 1517(a) of the
Money and Finance title

33 U.S.C. § 533(a) (1994)

willfully violates any provisions under the General
Bridge Authority subchapter

33 U.S.C. § 601 (1994)

knowingly and willfully violating the regulations concerning the reservoirs at the headwaters of the Mississippi River

33 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1) (1994)

willfully violates a provision of the Pollution Casualties
on High Seas chapter

33 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1994)

willfully violates any provision of the Deepwater Ports
chapter

42 U.S.C. § 2272 (1994)

willfully violates any provisions of sections 2077, 2122, or
2131 of the Public Health and Welfare title

42 U.S.C. § 2273(a), (b) (1994)

willfully violates any provision of the Development and
Control of Atomic Energy chapter

42 U.S.C. § 3537a(d) (1994)

willfully violates a prohibition of advance disclosure of
funding decisions of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development

42 U.S.C. § 5410(b) (1994)

knowingly and willfully violates section 5409 of the Public Health and Welfare title in a manner which threatens
the health or safety of any purchaser

42 U.S.C. § 6395(c) (1994)

knowingly and willfully violates section 6394 of the Public Health and Welfare title, after having been subjected
to a civil penalty for a prior violation of the section

42 U.S.C. § 7270b(b) (1994)

willfully violates a regulation relating to the entry upon
or carrying of any dangerous weapon onto the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve

42 U.S.C. § 8432 (1994)

willfully violates any provision of the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use chapter
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43 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (1994)

knowingly and willfully violates any regulation designed
to protect or conserve natural resources of outer continental shelf lands

43 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1994)

willfully violates the provision prohibiting the use of the
Alaska native fund for propaganda or political campaign
for individuals

43 U.S.C. § 1733(a) (1994)

knowingly and willfully violates any regulation with respect to the management, use, and protection of public
lands

46 U.S.C. § 3718(c) (1994 & Supp. 1998)

willfully and knowingly violating the chapter on the carriage of liquid bulk dangerous cargoes

47 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994)

willfully violates subsection prohibiting unauthorized use
of cable service

47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(1) (1994)

willfully violates subsection prohibiting unauthorized
publication or use of communications

49 U.S.C. § 521(b)(6)(A)-(B) (1994 &
Supp. 1998)

knowingly and willfully violates specified provisions or
regulations under the Transportation title

49 U.S.C. § 11906 (1994 & Supp. I 1995)

willfully violates a specified provision when a specific
penalty is not provided under the Rail—Civil and
Criminal Penalties chapter

49 U.S.C. § 16105 (1994 & Supp. I 1995)

willfully violates a specified provision when a specific
penalty is not provided under the Pipeline Carriers—
Civil and Criminal Penalties chapter

49 U.S.C. § 32709(b) (1994)

knowingly and willfully violates a regulation or order
under the Odometers chapter

49 U.S.C. § 46307 (1994)

knowingly or willfully violates section 40103(b)(3) of this
title

49 U.S.C. § 46316(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998)

knowingly and willfully violates a specified provision for
which there has been no specific penalty provided under
the Air Commerce and Safety—Enforcement and Penalties—Penalties chapter

49 U.S.C. § 47306 (1994)

knowingly and willfully violates a regulation prescribed
by the Secretary of Transportation
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49 U.S.C. § 5124 (1994)

willfully violating the Transportation of Hazardous Material chapter

50 U.S.C. § 167k (1994)

willfully violates any provision of the Helium Gas chapter

50 U.S.C. § 855(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998)

willfully violates any provision of the subchapter on the
registration of certain persons trained in foreign espionage systems

50 U.S.C. § 1705(b) (1994 & Supp. 1998)

willfully violates any license, order, or regulation under
the International Emergency Economic Powers chapter

50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b) (1994 & Supp. I
1995)

willfully violates any provision or regulation of the War
and National Defense Export Regulation Act

